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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 4th INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-GC-MH

4 DEC 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lesson Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RGS CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U)

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1. (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

a. General.

(1) During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division continued its participation in Operation DAN QUYEN-HINES.

(2) Organizational Structure. Task Organization. Operation HINES, 1 August - 31 October 1969, is set forth at Inclosure 1.

(3) Commanders and major staff as of the end of the reporting period are listed at Inclosure 2.

(4) Locations, coordinates for villages, LZ's and FSB's are listed at Inclosure 3.

(5) Mission. The Division's general mission during this reporting period was to conduct operations in support of C&N pacification programs; provide reaction forces to counter enemy attacks against key installations and populated centers; conduct operations to screen the CAMBODIAN border and to interdict enemy infiltration routes; secure lines of communication in the Division area of operations; maintain coordination and liaison with C&N forces and agencies; conduct offensive operations to destroy NVA and main force enemy units and be prepared to deploy one brigade with three battalions to conduct operations anywhere in VIETNAM.

(6) Concept of Operation. The Division accomplished its multiple missions by deploying units to areas of operation where several tasks could be performed simultaneously. Tasks which exceeded brigade control capabilities or which required assets not available to brigades were assigned missions under Division control.

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(a) Pacification: The 1st Brigade was responsible for that portion of BINH DINH Province that lies in the Division area. One battalion was assigned responsibility for AN TUC District, while BINH KHE District received a smaller effort because of its size. The 2d Brigade, with no fixed AO, conducted civic action projects in each of its areas of operation. The 3d Brigade was assigned responsibility in each of the three districts.

(b) Screen the Western approaches into the Division Area of Operation: The Division cavalry squadron under Division control accomplished this mission. It was assigned an area of operation along the CAMBODIAN Border from the southern PLEI THAP Valley in the north to the IA DRANG Valley in the south to include the CHU PA Mountains.

(c) Interdiction of Infiltration Routes: The infiltration route that starts in the CHU PA Mountain area and runs east in LE TRUNG District crossing Highway 14 midway between PLEIKU and KONTUM Cities were assigned to the battalion stationed in LE TRUNG District. The cavalry squadron was assigned the western origin of the infiltration route that originates in the IA DRANG Valley and runs east, crossing Highway 14S, 20-30 kilometers south of PLEIKU City. The remainder of this route was assigned to the battalions with the mission of pacification in the THAN AN and PHU NHON Districts where the route passes through their areas of operation.

(d) Highway Security: Highway 19E was secured by the tank battalion, reinforced, under Division control. The remaining routes were secured by the battalion with pacification responsibility in the district through which the route passes.

(e) Reaction Forces: The Division was prepared to counter enemy attacks against key installations and population centers within its area of operation. The concept was to relieve GVN forces in security missions to permit them to effect direct reinforcement. If this was not possible, the Division was prepared to employ forces first to cut off enemy withdrawal routes; second, to attack the enemy forces directly; and third, to reinforce the defenders. Primary responsibility rested with the brigade or separate battalion/squadron within whose area of operation the attack took place.

(f) Liaison with GVN: The Division maintained continuous liaison with Headquarters, II Corps. The brigades maintained continuous liaison with the provinces in which they are located. Battalions assigned a pacification mission maintained continuous liaison with

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the district to which they were assigned.

(g) Deter and Defeat Major Ground Attacks against PLEIKU and BINH DINH Province: The Division was deployed to cover all avenues of approach either by maneuver units or surveillance by a variety of means. The approach of major enemy units would be blocked by screening forces employing multiple means of fire support.

(h) Swing Brigade: The Division concept of operation calls for one brigade of three battalions with no fixed area of operation. This brigade was to be available for employment anywhere within or outside of the Division area of operations. Due to directed missions in the AN LAO Valley and increased enemy activity in PLEIKU, this concept has not been fully implemented so far.

b. Intelligence.

(1) General: Enemy activity throughout the Division area of operation during August remained light. All three NVA Regiments which had participated in the Summer Offensive withdrew into CAMBODIAN sanctuaries during July and were inactive during August. In KONTUM Province, the 304th Local Force Battalion attempted to fill the void created when the 28th and 66th NVA Regiments withdrew to CAMBODIA, and conducted frequent standoff attacks in the TANH CANH - DIEN BINH area.

In PLEIKU Province, local force units intensified their harassing activity and stepped up village attacks, propaganda lectures, and civilian proselyting while the 24th Regiment continued to refit and resupply in Base Area 702.

Elsewhere, the 95B Regiment, operating along the PLEIKU - BINH DINH border, was the only NVA regiment to remain active in the Division area of operation. The K-2 Battalion, 95B Regiment continued their interdiction of Highway 19 and harassed convoys and fixed installations along the highway between LZ ACTION and the MANG YANG Pass.

Increases in enemy activity in QUANG DUC and DARLAC Provinces required the deployment of a task force of one rifle company, an air cavalry troop and a ground cavalry troop to BAN ME THUOT on 1 September. This task force secured the ASP and airfield at BAN ME THUOT East and conducted surveillance operations along the CAMBODIAN Border in southern II Corps in support of the 23d ARVN Division.

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captured throughout South VIETNAM indicated that enemy intentions are to disband NVA units and assign the cadre to local force units giving the appearance that the NVA units have left the country.

(a) KONTUM: During the month of August, main force NVA units such as the 28th and 66th Regiments, and elements of the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment continued to conduct resupply and refitting activities in their CAMBODIAN sanctuaries in the Tri-Border area following their Summer Offensive in the DAK TO - BEN HET area. To fill the void left by the NVA forces, the 304th Local Force Battalion increased its activities during August and initiated standoff attacks against KON HONG, KON HOANG, TANH CANH, DIEN BINH, and DAK TO. The KONTUM City area was the scene of the month's most significant activity. On 25 August, KONTUM City received a rocket and mortar attack from an element of the 46th Artillery Battalion, and a bridge on Highway 14 north of the city was destroyed by an unknown size force. Elsewhere in the Province, KON KLEANG Village received a battalion size attack from the 5th Battalion, 24th NVA Regiment. Documents and prisoners of war attested to the fact that the 5th Battalion has been redesignated the 94th Group and had the responsibility of protecting the northern infiltration and resupply route running from the LAOTIAN Border east to the 3d NVA Division located in southern I Corps. The 94th Group was also given the responsibility of conducting harassing attacks in the MANG BUK area.

Enemy activity decreased throughout KONTUM in September and consisted of the mining of Highway 14N between KONTUM City and DAK TO and sporadic village harassment. The most significant attack occurred on 25 September, when the village of TRI DAO received three separate standoff attacks and light ground probes from estimated company size forces. Activity remained light until the first week of October, when increased enemy activity was noted in the DAK PEK area.

During the first week of October, Special Forces elements made frequent contact with elements ranging from squad to company strength. The enemy forces were identified as both NVA and VC, but no unit designation could be obtained. In addition to the activity in the DAK PEK area, frequent enemy reconnaissance activity was noted in the DAK TO - BEN HET area possibly indicating a renewal of an enemy offensive in the Tri-Border area. On 4 October, the 404th Scout Company (ARVN) made contact with a squad size enemy element north of KONTUM City resulting in two NVA captured. Interrogation of the PW's revealed that their unit was the 406th Sapper Battalion. This was the first identification of the 406th Sapper Battalion in over a year.

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Elements captured later in the month once again identified elements of the 406th Sapper Battalion.

Enemy activity increased throughout the month and reached a highpoint on 25 October when the enemy launched their current offensive. All installations received heavy mortar attacks and ARVN ground and air elements made numerous contacts with enemy forces. Activity moderate for the remainder of the month.

(b) PLEIKU: Following the termination of the enemy's Summer Offensive in July, both NVA and VC main force units withdrew into their base areas to refit and resupply. During the month of August, enemy activity in PLEIKU Province was limited to harassing attacks by local militia forces against villages and hamlets located in rural areas. Enemy forces appeared to be content with limited disruption of the pacification effort. These harassing activities increased in intensity until the highpoint was reached in September. Elements of the 1st Composite Battalion, operating out of the southern CHU PA, conducted infrequent standoff attacks on friendly installations following the PLEIKU - Camp Xaari area during August and September. Although there was a noted decrease in attacks on villages and friendly installations following the mid-September highpoint, increasing reconnaissance activity by elements of the 4th Battalion, 24th Regiment in the PLEI MRONG area and the 631st Composite Battalion in the PLEI area, indicated that enemy forces were once again preparing a new offensive.

Contacts and LRP sightings to the west and northwest of PLEIKU during the first week of October, confirmed enemy movement out of the CHU PA. It was also believed that the 6th Battalion and the remainder of the 24th NVA Regiment would shortly move back into the CHU PA from their CAMBODIAN sanctuary. Increased contacts with enemy forces in the PLEI MRONG area in mid-October indicated that the 24th Regiment had completed resupply and staging operations and was prepared to initiate attacks on villages and friendly installations in the PLEI MRONG area and also commence interdiction of Highway 14 between PLEIKU and HUE. Elements of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mechanized) began to encounter platoon and company size NVA forces on a daily basis. Elements captured during these contacts, identified elements of both the 4th and 6th Battalions, 24th Regiment. Elsewhere in PLEIKU, the 1st Composite Battalion re-established their offensive and subjected OASIS to their first rocket and mortar attack in more than five months. The 631st Composite Battalion continued their participation in the enemy offensive and rocketed allied installations in PLEIKU and finally Camp Xaari during the last week of October.

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(c) BINH DINH: In August the 1st Brigade continued their operation targeted against the 18th NVA Regiment in their extensive base area to the northeast of AN KHE. Elements of the 18th NVA Regiment had been evading to the north since mid-July in an effort to avoid decisive contact with the 1st Brigade forces. One battalion from the 1st Brigade was lifted to an area north of the regiment's location in an attempt to drive the enemy back into friendly elements sweeping from the south. Following sporadic contact in the northern area, the 18th NVA Regiment fled northeast across the SONG CON River into Base Area 226, leaving behind rear security elements to slow down friendly forces in pursuit. Sporadic contact with the small size units occurred throughout the month of August. The numerous bunker complexes found, contacts with enemy forces, heavy ground-to-air fire encountered, the uncovering of a hospital complex, and the discovery of weapons and rice caches attested to the regiment's extensive use of the area as a base area. When the 1st Brigade terminated their operation against the 18th NVA Regiment, they had accounted for over 300 NVA/VC killed and 5,000 pounds of rice captured. Elsewhere in Southern BINH DINH, the K-2 Battalion, 95B Regiment increased their interdiction of Highway 19 between the MANG YANG Pass and LZ ACTION during August. In late August, a large number of APD readings, sensor activations, and visual reconnaissance sightings indicated that elements of the K-2 Battalion located north of the Highway 19 were moving south on their way to VC Valley for resupply. At this time, the 1st Brigade commenced a multi-battalion operation in VC Valley targeted against the K-2 Battalion, 95B Regiment.

In mid-September, 1st Brigade forces terminated their successful operation targeted against the 95B Regiment. The Regiment was forced to break down into squad size elements in an attempt to evade the sweeping forces, but not before they lost 94 KIA, 5 tons of rice, and miscellaneous small arms and munitions. In addition, more than 724,850 piasters were removed from the bodies of two dead NVA officers. Prior to the termination of the VC Valley operation, 1st Brigade initiated an operation against the GIA LAI Provincial Committee in their base area to the northwest of AN KHE. Only sporadic contact was encountered with squad size security elements from the Provincial Unit. Following this operation, Division attention was directed once again to the 18th NVA Regiment which had relocated into its old base area in Base Area 226. After the operation had commenced, the 2d Brigade elements were joined by ROKA forces to conduct a combined operation against the 18th NVA Regiment and what were believed to be elements of the BINH DINH Provincial Unit. Although only sporadic contact could be made, over 28 tons of material were captured and over 120 enemy killed by combined forces.

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UNIT	ESTIMATED STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION
B-3 Front Headquarters	1,000 (+)	Unlocated in CAMBODIA
250th Transportation Group	750	DARLAC
40th Artillery Regiment Headquarters	300	Tri-Border area
30th Battalion/40th Arty Regiment	300	Unknown
32d Battalion/40th Arty Regiment	210	Unknown
33d Battalion/40th Artillery Regiment	240	Unknown
41st Battalion/40th Arty Regiment	210	Unknown
42d Battalion/40th Arty Regiment	210	Unknown
46th Battalion/40th Arty Regiment	210	Vic AS 8609
74th Battalion/40th Arty Regiment	210	Unknown
K-16 Tank Battalion/40th Arty	240	Unknown
UI Artillery Battalion (37mm AA) 40th	250	Tri-Border Area
UI Artillery Battalion (105 How) 40th	250	Vic BA 701
18th NVA Regiment	1,200	Vic BA 226
24th NVA Regiment	900	CHU PA
28th NVA Regiment	1,400	Unknown
66th NVA Regiment	1,250	Unknown
95B NVA Regiment	625	Vic BA 202
H-15 Local Force Battalion	150	Southeast of PLEIKU
K-20 Sapper Battalion	150	Vic ZB 0935
K-25A Engineer Battalion	300	Unknown
K-25B Engineer Battalion	250	Unknown
K-28 Sapper/Bcn Battalion	150	Unknown
K-37 Sapper Battalion	320	Unknown
X-45 Local Force Battalion	200	Southeast of PLEIKU
94th Group	200	Vic AS 9851
301st Local Force Battalion	350	Vic BA 237
304th Local Force Battalion	225	Vic ZB 1026
K-394th Composite Battalion	360	Vic BA 740
401st Sapper Battalion	275	Vic BA 238
406th Sapper Battalion	400	Vic AS 7921
408th Sapper Battalion	250	Vic BA 229
631st Composite Battalion	400	CHU PA
Infrastructure	4,400	
Guerilla Forces	2,475	
TOTAL ENEMY FORCES	20,510	

(3) Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques:

(a) A Division Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP), during the month of September, encountered a VC squad utilizing a scout dog with the point man. When the dog observed the LRP team, he commenced to bark and pointed in the direction of the LRP team thus alerting the VC element to the presence of the LRPs. This was the first encounter in

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the Division area of operations of enemy forces utilizing dogs as an early warning system.

(b) A significant tactic recently noted by the 4th Infantry Division forces is the enemy's use of short fuzed RPG-7 rounds to obtain an air burst. On several occasions recently, RPG-7 rounds fired at friendly forces have detonated prior to striking a solid object. All RPG-7 rounds are armed with a self-destruct mechanism to explode after traveling approximately 800 meters. Indications are that enemy forces are taking advantage of this limitation in an effort to inflict maximum casualties.

(c) A recent operation conducted in Base Area 226 in BINH DINH Province uncovered a munitions cache belonging to the 18th NVA Regiment containing 56 rounds of mixed 107-mm and 122-mm rockets. Until this discovery, the regiment was not credited with having a rocket capability. Also, documents and a POW captured from the 95B Regiment indicated that the regiment has a cache of 122-mm rockets. Although both regiments have rocket caches, it is not believed that they have qualified artillery personnel assigned. It is possible that enemy units have stockpiled rockets in their base areas with the intention of moving in trained artillery personnel when a lucrative target presents itself.

(d) A returnee from the K-4 Battalion, 24th NVA Regiment revealed that he observed a new type of 122-mm rocket which is termed a DKB or A-12 rocket. The returnee also stated that the DKB used a shell 80 centimeters long, with a warhead 25 centimeters long. He also indicated that the tubes could be assembled together for mass firing or could be fired singly.

(e) A returnee from the 24th Regiment revealed the following security and signaling methods employed by the 24th Regiment during missions: A piece of painted luminous wood is tied to the back of the head for recognition during hours of darkness; units may identify themselves by a prearranged number of taps on a rifle butt or a particular vocal clicking sound; units may identify themselves by a white cloth or band on the arm or some predesignated place of the body such as just below the left elbow.

(f) Recent POW testimony indicated that enemy units have captured dufflebag equipment and have sent the devices to North VIETNAM for analysis. The POW also stated that the NVA have sensor teams operating in South VIETNAM with the mission of finding and

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destroying or booby trapping our devices. Recently, sensor fields in the DUC CO area were found marked indicating general locations of the string and warnings to avoid the area.

(4) Recapitulation of Enemy Battle Losses:

(a) Personnel:	KIA (BC)	969
	NVA CIA	4
	VC/VMC CIA	8
	Total	981
(b) Weapons:	S/A	173
	C/S	17
	Total	190
(c) Ammunition:	S/A rounds	100,269
	C/S rounds	1,403
	Grenades	439
	Mines	133
(d) Miscellaneous Captured Items:	Explosives	206 lbs
	Documents	534 inches
	Rice	38,945 lbs
	Salt	2,082 lbs
(e) Enemy Facilities		
	Destroyed Structures	1,216
	Fortifications	5,904

(5) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Probable Courses of Action:

(a) Capabilities

1 The 40th Artillery Regiment, with its artillery battalions, is capable of conducting standoff attacks utilizing recoilless rifles, 82-mm and 120-mm mortars, 107-mm, 122-mm, and 140-mm rockets, 85-mm guns and 105-mm howitzers throughout KONTUM, PLEIKU, and DARLAC Provinces.

2 The K-16 Tank Battalion (PT-76) has the capability of conducting armor attacks in KONTUM and PLEIKU along the CAMBODIAN Border.

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3 The 18th NVA Regiment has the capability of conducting multi-battalion size attacks against allied installations, isolated camps, and populated areas in central BINH DINH Province. They can also interdict Highway 19 and the pipeline from BINH KHE to AN KHE.

4 The 24th NVA Regiment is capable of conducting battalion size attacks against allied installations and villages and hamlets located in the PLEIKU MRONG area and interdict Highway 14 from PLEIKU north to KONTUM City.

5 The 95B Regiment is capable of conducting up to battalion size attacks against fire support bases, isolated camps, and populated areas in the PLEIKU - BINH DINH border area. They can also interdict Highway 19 by ambush and mining, attack pump stations and bridges, and destroy sections of the pipeline from AN KHE to PLEIKU.

6 The 631 Composite Battalion is capable of conducting up to battalion size ground attacks supported by mortar and rocket fire in the PLEIKU - Camp Enari - LZ Oasis area.

7 The K-25A and K-25B Battalions are capable of building trail networks, fortifications, and artillery positions. They can also conduct up to company size attacks on allied installations and rural areas.

8 The K-20 and K-28 Sapper Battalions can conduct limited attacks on allied installations and isolated villages and hamlets.

9 The 408th Sapper Battalion can conduct company size sapper attacks supported by mortar and possibly rocket fire against allied installations and populated areas in central and eastern PLEIKU.

10 The 304th Local Force Battalion can conduct company size attacks in the TAN CANH - DIEN BINH area and interdict Highway 14 from KONTUM City north to DAK TO.

11 The 94th Group is capable of conducting ground and mortar attacks in up to battalion strength in northeastern KONTUM.

(b) Enemy Vulnerabilities

1 Enemy units are vulnerable to airstrikes and artillery fire when in bivouac or massing for an attack.

2 Enemy weapons, munitions, and food caches are vulnerable to

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allied search and clear operations.

3 Enemy lines of communication are sufficiently extended to make them vulnerable to interdiction by allied operations.

4 Enemy units are vulnerable to psychological operations due to low morale, heavy personnel losses, and shortages of food and medical supplies.

5 Enemy movement is vulnerable to detection by airborne personnel detection and sensor devices.

6 Enemy forces have limited logistical support and cannot conduct extended offensive operations unless they are near existing base areas.

(c) Probable Courses of Action

1 Throughout the Division area of operations, enemy forces are expected to continue their present offensive for a short period of time and will probably conduct one more offensive before the end of the year.

2 In KONTUM Province, elements of the 40th Artillery Regiment are expected to conduct mortar and rocket attacks against BEN HET, DAK TO, TANH CANH, DIEN BINH, POLEI KLENG, and KONTUM City. These attacks can be accompanied by up to battalion size ground attacks.

3 The 304th Local Force Battalion is expected to continue harassing activity in the TANH CANH - DIEN BINH area and interdict Highway 14 from KONTUM City north to DAK TO.

4 Other local force units will probably conduct platoon to company strength harassing attacks in the DAK SEANG, DAK PEK, PLATEAU GI, and MANG BUK areas.

5 In PLEIKU Province, the 24th Regiment is expected to conduct up to company size attacks on RF/PF installations and villages and hamlets in the vicinity of PLEI MRONG and interdict Highway 14 between PLEIKU and KONTUM City.

6 The 631st Composite Battalion is expected to conduct attacks by fire on the PLEIKU - Camp Enari - LZ Oasis area.

7 The 408th Sapper Battalion is expected to increase harassing attacks in central and eastern PLEIKU Province. The battalion can also be expected to conduct sapper training for enemy units in PLEIKU Province.

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8 Local force units are expected to harass lines of communication and conduct terrorism and assassination activities, and small scale attacks on hamlets and villages in an attempt to disrupt the GVN pacification effort.

9 The 95B Regiment is expected to conduct limited squad to company size attacks against bridge security elements, strong points, pump stations, and convoys along Highway 19 in eastern PLEIKU and western BINH DINH. In addition, they will also conduct mining of Highway 19 and interdict the pipeline.

10 In BINH DINH Province, elements of the 18th NVA Regiment are expected to attempt disruption of the GVN pacification effort in VINH THANH Valley and conduct limited interdiction of Highway 19 east of AN KHE.

11 In DARLAC Province, enemy forces are expected to conduct attacks by fire and light ground probes against BAN ME THUOT, LAC THIEN, BUON HO, and surrounding areas.

12 In QUANG DUC Province, installations in the BU PRANG - DUC LAP area could possibly receive multibattalion size attacks supported by mortar and rocket fire.

(6) Military Intelligence Activities

(a) General: During the past quarter, the 4th Military Intelligence Detachment (MID) provided Counterintelligence (CI), Imag, Interpretation (II), and Interrogation Prisoners of War (IPW) support to the Division. Several innovations were made during the reporting period to enhance the final product provided the Division. In addition, special emphasis was placed on the internal security of Camp Enari and the denial of classified or sensitive information to low level, or potential low level enemy agents.

(b) Counterintelligence: The activities of the CI Section during the reporting period continued to include preplanned operations against small local force units and individuals with the majority of the CI effort being devoted to increasing the number of agent sources within the Tactical Area of Responsibility. A combined operation was conducted during the quarter to screen all indigenous employees working at Camp Enari. The highly successful operation resulted in the identification and neutralization of 31 VC and VCS. The emphasis placed on internal security and security of classified material continued, with repeated unannounced CI inspections plus inspections of unit burn areas used to destroy classified material.

(c) Interrogation of Prisoners of War: Prisoner interrogation

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methods were enhanced during the last quarter with the utilization of a tape recorder during interrogation sessions. The utilization of a tape recorder allowed the interpreters to obtain a comprehensive interrogation from particularly intelligent or knowledgeable detainees. IPW also provided direct support to the 2-8th Infantry (Mech) during their operation in the eastern CHU PA. A HOI CHANH from the 24th NVA Regiment and a representative from IPW accompanied the 2-8th Infantry (Mech) during a sweep operation and provided the battalion with an intimate knowledge of enemy techniques and probable enemy locations.

(d) Imagery Interpretation Section: During the past quarter, the II Section coordinated with the OB Section on several occasions. A concerted effort by II, OB, and IPW during the period resulted in a comprehensive study of the PLEI TRAP Valley. MOHAWK and BIRDDOG missions have been flown recently to keep the study current. The II Section also provided overlays of hard targets, trails, and cultivated areas for operations in the CHU PA and Base Area 226. In addition, II coordinated with Dufflebag for the emplacement of ground sensors in the PLEI TRAP Valley.

(7) Communications Security (COMSEC): During the past quarter, use of unauthorized codes continued to be the most common security violation. Additionally, there was an increase of transmissions of classified information in the clear. This was partially caused by the large influx of new personnel into the Division but was remedied by firm disciplinary action by commanders and by continued COMSEC instruction by the 374th RRC. During the period 1 August through 31 October 1969, the 374th RRC reported a total of 33 COMSEC violations in the Division.

c. Operations and Training Activities.

(1) Operations.

(a) The 4th Infantry Division was disposed as shown on Map 1, Inclosure 4, at the beginning of this reporting period.

(b) Enemy activity in the Division area of operations remained at a low level during the months of August and September. Intelligence indicated the continued presence of elements of the 24th NVA Regiment in the CHU PA Mountains area and to the northwest of PLEI MRONG; 953 Regiment units south of Highway 19E; and a major portion of the 18th NVA Regiment units northeast of AN KHE. Enemy forces in the BEN HET - DAK TO - TAN CANH area during June withdrew in July and did not appear again until October. However, there were numerous small contacts in the POLEI KLENG area during September

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that indicated VC/VMC forces remained in the area. Highway 19E and the adjacent pipeline continued to be targets for VC/NVA, in the BINH DINH area. During September, the Division continued operations with GVN forces, whenever possible. Activity against local VC/VCI continued in cooperation/coordination with provincial and local government officials.

The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was sent under the operational control of the 1/3d Airborne Brigade for operations in the AN LAO Valley on 20 September. Because of the increased enemy activity in QUANG DUC and DARLAC Provinces, Task Force FIGHTER was formed at the end of September at BAN ME THUOT in support of the 23d ARVN Division. The Division committed A Company, 2-35th Infantry and A and D Troops of the 7-17th Cavalry to this Task Force. The 3d ARVN Cavalry resumed the responsibility for Highway 14N from the 2-8th Infantry (Mech). The 1-10th Cavalry completed a phased standdown at Camp Radcliff in preparation to assume a screening mission in the west along the CAMBODIAN Border. The three days of non-aggressiveness during the VC/NVA standdown significantly lowered the number of combat operations conducted in September. The enemy continued to rebuild and resupply his forces until October.

Enemy activity increased throughout the Division area of operations during October. Heavy enemy reconnaissance activity was noted both in KONUM and PLEIKU Provinces during the first week of October. Increased activity in the PLEIKU area indicated the elements of the 24th NVA Regiment were preparing to launch a new highpoint. Enemy activity culminated on 25 October, when the enemy launched the first phase of their current offensive and conducted numerous attacks by fire and light ground probes. The 631st Composite Battalion became active and conducted attacks by fire in the PLEIKU Camp Khari Oasis area. Villages to the east of Camp Khari were also subjected to harassing attacks. The 2d Brigade was joined in late October by BOKA forces for combined operations against elements of the 18th NVA Regiment. Enemy activity was light in the area until late October when enemy forces increased interdiction of Highway 19 to the east and west of AN KHE.

(c) 1st Brigade: Operation WAYNE JAVELIN continued during August with elements of four infantry battalions and a cavalry squadron conducting operations along Highway 19E and its adjacent pipeline, pacification operations in cooperation and coordination with LE TRUNG and AN TUC Districts, and search and destroy operations in NVA dominated areas north of AN KHE and into DAK PAYOU Valley (VC Valley). The 2-8th Infantry (Mech) was replaced on Highway 19E by the 1-10th

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Cavalry (-) from the 3d Brigade and returned to 2d Brigade control. Company A, 3-12th Infantry, supported by a PS artillery platoon, provided the vital support for the GVN pacification operation south of Highway 19E in LE TRUNG District by conducting screening, ambush and search and clear operations. On 15 August it was determined that local GVN efforts had developed to the point of being able to both pacify the area and at the same time secure themselves. As a result, US support was released and returned to their parent units. Of particular significance was the 1st Brigade's penetration of NVA safe areas north of AN KHE against elements of the 18th NVA Regiment during Operation GAFFEY BLUE (5-25 Aug) and south of Highway 19E near the DAK PAYOU Valley against the 95B Regiment. Operation GAFFEY BLUE involved the 3-8th Infantry and elements of the 1-8th Infantry and 1-69th Armor. The number of contacts, findings, results, and defense of the area, plus the proximity of the area to Base Area 226, made it evident that the boundaries of Base Area 226 were subject to change. The movement of significant IR's from the 18th Regiment's base area to Base Area 226 added credence to this thesis. Results of the twenty day operation were: 100 NVA KIA (a total of 300 KIA for the entire operation of two months), 3 POW's, 4,800 lbs of rice captured, and 352 structures and fortifications destroyed. Three US were KIA and thirteen WIA. Nine helicopters were damaged or destroyed during the operation as a result of heavy ground-to-air fire. South of Highway 19E, in the vicinity of the SONG BA River and DAK PAYOU Valley, the 3-12th Infantry and 1-69th Armor initiated operations against local VC and the withdrawing elements of the 95B Regiment. This operation was to serve to neutralize Base Area 202. There was a coordinated increase in VC initiated activity during the night of 11/12 August which included a sapper attack on Camp Radcliff; seven vehicles and two buildings were destroyed, and one vehicle and seven buildings damaged. There were no friendly casualties. August 12th was most productive with regard to enemy battle losses. In eight separate incidents there were 35 NVA KIA and 2 US WIA. Operations in support of GVN pacification efforts in LE TRUNG and AN TUC had the full cooperation of all agencies and continued into September.

Operation WAYNE JAVELIN continued into September. The 3-12th Infantry, with supporting 105mm and 155mm artillery, pursued elements of K2/95B Regiment after their abortive attempt to interdict Highway 19. As the enemy broke up into small units and withdrew south of Base Area 202, the 3-12th Infantry and an air cavalry troop from the 7-17th Cavalry, reacting to intelligence reports, carried on running contacts more than 30 kilometers south of Highway 19 into PHU BON Province. This rapid penetration deep into and thru

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Base Area 202 proved to completely disorganize the enemy, deny him use of a safe haven and negate his offensive capability for an extended period. In conjunction with two Regional Force Companies from PHU THIEN District, this operation also countered the enemy's threat to the growing area north of CHEO REO. During one of the numerous contacts of the 7-17th Cavalry, the aero-rifle platoon was inserted on 4 September after gunships expended on an estimated 20-25 NVA. Found as a result of the sweep were two 9-mm pistols, and the bodies of two NVA officers with packs containing 734,350 plasters. At the month's end, the 2-10th Infantry returned to the AN KHE area to assist in pacification and highway security with the 1-10th Cavalry. Operation WAYNE BOULDER was initiated 10 September, by the 1-8th Infantry targeted against GIA LAI VC forces north of AN KHE. This operation was preceded by diversionary air cavalry missions, air strikes, and LRP insertions. The finding of a switchboard, field telephones and documents indicated the VC political headquarters in the area had displaced in chaos. A significant action during the operation was the sighting of an enemy company size force on 11 September by A Troop, 7-17th Cavalry. Gunships and air strikes were employed followed by the insertion of the aero-rifle platoon and D Company, 1-8th Infantry. Twenty-five bodies were found along with weapons and rucksacks.

Operation WAYNE JAVELIN terminated on 18 October. The relatively small number and low intensity of enemy contacts attested to the success of this operation during the preceding month. All enemy activity appeared primarily directed toward incidents of ground-to-air fire and minor interdictions of the highway and pipeline. Operation WAYNE BOULDER terminated 11 October. The most significant action occurred on 5 October at 0100 hours at FB LARRY. The CP of the 1-8th Infantry received a coordinated attack from the south and east by an estimated reinforced platoon. Although three individuals breached the wire, quick employment of a squad reaction force drove them off, and the combination of artillery, SPOOKY and ground fire forced the NVA to break contact at 0200. Operation WAYNE BOULDER netted 93 enemy KIA, 1 HOI CHANH, 8,000 lbs of rice, 5 AK-47's, 650 lbs of salt and 2,750 lbs of corn. Operation WAYNE BREAKER commenced on 18 October with 1-8th Infantry in a security and pacification mission in the SONG BA River Valley. Results to date included 7 NVA KIA, 1 LAW, 2 automatic weapons, and 5 small arms with no US losses. On 14 October, the 1-10th Cavalry released the mission of security for Highway 19E to the 1-69th Armor. Both units were placed directly under Division control. The armor battalion was initially reinforced with one infantry company to provide security for the Rome Plow operation, and one infantry company as a reaction force and tank security element. The highway was free of major action until 18 October, when

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incidents began occurring with increasing frequency. On 20 October the pipeline was interdicted with small arms fire, B Company, 1 69th Armor, while escorting a convoy received small arms and B 40 fire, and a convoy from the 8th Transportation Company received small arms and B-40 fire from an estimated fifteen VC. A reaction force engaged the enemy and killed ten. On 24 October, a large culvert was blown on the highway, fifty meters of pipeline were destroyed and a 2½ ton truck damaged by a mine. On 27 October, Bridge #33 was blown and on 28 October, a large crater was blown in the road east of AN KHE. On 28 October, an additional infantry company was placed under the operational control of the 1-69th Armor. The addition of the infantry company will now give the armored force more flexibility in providing road security.

(d) 2d Brigade: Operation PUTNAM TIGER continued during August, with screening, road security, and both US and combined search and clear/pacification operations. A liaison team was established with KONTUM PLOCC and DIOCC. The 2-8th Infantry (Mech) returned from 1st Brigade control and assumed the security mission for Highway 14, KONTU pacification support in the vicinity of PLEI OP/PLEI O, and at the end of August, also assumed security responsibility for Highway 19E from PLEIKU to Bridge #30. The 1-22d Infantry moved from its screening mission north and west of POLEI KLENG and initiated search and clear operations on what is referred to as the PLEIKU Rocket Box (ZA 1453). This move released an ARVN Ranger Battalion from a security role to allow its deployment to BAN ME THUOT for search and destroy operations. Keeping a unit in the area northwest of PLEIKU significantly reduces the threat of 122mm rockets being fired against this major population center and its associated military facilities. The 1-12th Infantry continued operations against day behind elements of the K-4 Battalion, 24th NVA Regiment in the PLEI MRONG area with CIDG forces from that camp. A battalion size combined operation was conducted with CIDG forces in the mountains west of PLEI MRONG. Intelligence indicated the presence of a company size NVA force and a resupply route in the area. No contact was made; the enemy successfully avoided detection. On 23 August, LRP 2C engaged an NVA squad. Gunships and artillery were employed in support resulting in 9 NVA killed and no friendly casualties.

Operation PUTNAM TIGER was brought to a successful close on 22 September, climaxing an operation which began on 22 April as the NVA "Summer Offensives" was initiated with the 24th NVA Regiment moving east out of the CHU PA Mountains toward Highway 14 in conjunction with the 26th and 66th NVA Regiments' movement toward DAK TO. The five month operation, designed to keep Highway 14 open to military and civilian traffic, destroy the elements of the 24th NVA Regiment

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operating in the area, protect the population and assist in KONTUM Province pacification efforts southwest of KONTUM resulted in 562 NVA KIA, 51 POW/HOI CHANH, 157 rounds of mortar and rocket munitions and 13,928 rounds of small arms captured. Use of Rome Plow and dozers against the numerous bunker complexes found in the jungle resulted in the destruction of 4,979 fortifications, denying the enemy safe access to Highway 14 and providing the local inhabitants many acres of open area for cultivation. Friendly losses were 81 killed and 245 wounded. Since the 24th NVA Regiment had only two battalions, it was considered combat ineffective as a result of continued contact with the 2d Brigade in May and withdrew to its sanctuaries, leaving behind only a token force. During September, the 2d Brigade relocated to Camp Radcliff with a TAC CP at LZ HARD TIMES. The 1-12th Infantry, which had been astride the traditional NVA routes to Highway 14, was placed under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade and moved to LZ ENGLISH for subsequent operations in the AN LAO Valley. On 21 September, the brigade began an assault on Base Area 226 with the combat assault of A and C Companies, 1-22d Infantry. The operation, PUTNAM TIGER, involved the 3-8th Infantry, 1-22d Infantry and B Company, 1-69th Armor (-). The operation was designed to disorganize and scatter the 18th NVA Regimental elements in the Base Area, thus, relieving any threat to that portion of Highway 19 between AN KHE and QUI NHON and the rich rice coastal area south of PHU MY. Two major combined operations were conducted involving 2d Brigade units with two CSF companies from PLEI WRONG in the CHU PA Mountains and with the 2d Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment around Base Area 229. These were highly successful and continued the ever increasing cooperation/coordination between the 4th Infantry Division and II Corps.

During October, Operation PUTNAM COUGAR continued the assault on Base Area 226 and terminated on 28 October. The coordinated operations of US/GVN forces effectively disorganized the elements of the 18th NVA Regiment and forced them to scatter into other areas. Combined operations with the GRID from 2 October until 19 October were extremely successful in that caches of equipment were uncovered. These included 90 Mauser carbines and SKS rifles, 20 AT mines, 80 AP mines, six 75mm RH rounds, 57,460 small arms rounds, 2 MAS-36 rifles, one 9mm machinegun, 6 AK-47 rifles, one P-38 pistol, two 82mm mortars, 400 82mm mortar rounds and 402 81mm mortar rounds, 5 light machineguns, 1 RPG-2 rocket launcher, 23 RPG-2 rounds, twenty-six 120mm mortar rounds, 1 CHICOM machinegun, 760 12.7mm rounds and 5,590 lbs of rice. US losses were 4 KIA and 14 WIA, while the enemy suffered 9 KIA and one prisoner. The discovery and location of the caches indicated that the enemy units had been planning significant

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offensive operations in the areas of Highway 19 to the south and the heavily populated coastal region of BINH DINH Province. The equipment discoveries have very likely preempted and restricted enemy incursions into populated areas and have had a favorable effect on the population and the pacification program.

(e) 3d Brigade: The brigade terminated Operation GREENE GALLOP resulting in 8 NVA KIA, 14 detained and 1,420 lbs of rice and 3,232 rounds of small arms ammunition captured or destroyed. The 1-10th Cavalry moved to the 1st Brigade. The 1-14th Infantry terminated Operation GREENE ORANGE III on 5 August resulting in 83 NVA KIA, 6 POW's, 53 detained and 21 weapons, 733 lbs of rice and 156 structures and fortifications captured or destroyed. The 1-35th Infantry terminated Operation GREENE AX on 5 August resulting in 12 NVA KIA, 11 POW's and 11 detained, 5 weapons, five 122-mm rocket boosters, sixteen 60-mm mortar rounds and 308 structures and fortifications were captured or destroyed. With the termination of these operations, Operation GREENE ACE was initiated involving all elements of the 3d Brigade. Emphasis was placed on combined operations. Two major combined operations of battalion size were conducted involving the 1-42d ARVN Battalion, RF/PF and CIDG. On 14 August, as a combined CSF and Company B, 1-14th Infantry force terminated a PLEIKU Sector controlled operation and were moving out of the area of operations, an ammunition cache was found consisting of 113 32-mm and 30 60-mm mortar rounds and 14,000 rounds of small arms. Pacification in PHU NHON and THANH AN Districts were supported on a continuous basis by elements of the 1-14th and 1-35th Infantry.

Operation GREENE ACE continued during September with the enlargement of the brigade area of operations to include the area previously occupied by the 2d Brigade. This change came about during the latter part of September when two major adjustments of the Division area of operation took place. First, the 24th STZ resumed Highway 14N security from the 2d Brigade with the 3d ARVN Cavalry, and second, the 2d Brigade penetrated Base Area 226 and subsequently moved its entire headquarters into the BINH KHE area. The 2-8th Infantry (Mech) came under the operational control of the 3d Brigade upon departure of the 2d Brigade and was employed along Highway 19, security force for MARY LOU while it was being closed out, and as a maneuver force west of PLEIKU. There were numerous platoon and company size combined operations leading to a continued increase in RF/PF and CSF combat effectiveness. The 1-14th Infantry and the 1-35th Infantry continued RF/PF training programs in PHU NHON and AN THUC Districts. The M-16 transition training was one of the most important portions

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of this program. An attack by fire was conducted against the CP, 1-35th Infantry at FB GYPSY on 16 September. Thirty rounds of mixed 75mm recoilless rifle and 82mm mortar rounds were received. Three US were wounded in the shelling. Three secondary explosions were observed as a result of counter mortar fire. On 29 September, west of the CHU PA, B Company, 2-35th Infantry minus and a PLEI DJERENG CSF company made contact with an estimated NVA company. The Reconnaissance Platoon and C Company reinforced the six hour contact. Results were 2 US KIA and 8 WIA; 25 NVA were KIA. To assist in the security of BU PRANG and BAN ME THUOT area, A Company, 2-35th Infantry was placed under the operational control of Division Task Force FIGHTER along with B and D Troops, 7-17th Cavalry.

Operation GREENE ACE terminated on 16 October and relinquished a large part of the western sector of their area of operation to the 1-10th Cavalry which, under Division control, initiated a screening operation, KRAMER WHITE, designed to preclude infiltration of units from CAMBODIA into the Division secured areas. The search and clear/pacification operations of the 3d Brigade were redesignated GREENE BEAR. In the PLEI MRONG area on 19 October at 0835, C Company, 2-8th Infantry (Mech) received small arms and B-40 fire from a well dug in enemy force. The one hour and twenty minute contact resulted in 2 US KIA, 3 WIA and 2 enemy KIA, 1 AK-47 and 1 B-40 captured. At 1207 A Company, while attempting to reinforce C Company, received small arms and mortar fire from an unknown size enemy force. Contact was maintained until 1312 and resulted in 4 US KIA, 16 WIA and 14 NVA KIA. Strong enemy action continued in the PLEI MRONG area resulting in the 2-8th Infantry (Mech) being placed under the operational control of the Division on 20 October and initiating Operation HODGES BLACK. Sporadic contact continued in this area. On 21 October at 1705, B Company, 2-8th Infantry (Mech), while attempting to recover an armored personnel carrier, received small arms, automatic weapon and B-40 fire from an unknown size enemy force. Gunships, tactical aircraft and artillery supported the infantry as they closed with the enemy. When the enemy broke contact at 1745, 24 NVA bodies were counted and friendly losses were 1 KIA and 1 WIA. On 23 October, A Company found 40 large fortifications in a small area all connected with communications wire. This is believed to have been a regimental or battalion CP complex controlling the engaged forces. In the bunker 13 NVA bodies were counted. Contact continued until the end of October and resulted in 4 US KIA, 17 WIA, and 70 enemy KIA. The engagement of this unit in the PLEI MRONG area has seriously disrupted plans for interdiction of Highway 14 and coordinated attacks on PLEIKU,

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KONTUM and US installations in the area. The continued use of Rome Flows in destroying the numerous bunker and fortification complexes in the area will deny the enemy free access to Highway 14 and provide local inhabitants additional cultivation areas. The lack of contact permitted a greater effort to be directed toward pacification programs, civic action and training of ARVN elements in the GREENE BEAR area of operations. This training has enhanced the combat effectiveness of the VIETNAMESE units involved, and the other programs have engendered additional confidence from the people in the governmental programs. On 20 October, the 3d Brigade and the 42d ARVN Regiment initiated Operation GUINT THANG 35/GREENE BULLET in the CHU PA area with the 1-35th and 3-12th Infantry, and the 2d and 3d Battalions, 42d Regiment. This operation, designed to intrude into a known enemy sanctuary, was preceded by a one week artillery preparation of more than 9,000 rounds, 141 tactical air sorties, and 34 B-52 sorties. There was little enemy activity until 29 October at 1045 when the 2d Platoon of B Company, 3-12th Infantry was engaged by an estimated two platoons of NVA/VC in bunkers. They were reinforced by D Company. Support was provided by artillery, gunships and tactical air. Contact broke at 1600. Results were 2 US KIA, 12 MIA and 8 NVA KIA. On 30 and 31 October, contact continued in the CHU PA solely in the 3-12th Infantry area. On the morning of 30 October, the CP location received small arms and 82mm mortar fire. Eighteen US were wounded by the mortars. On 31 October, A Company received small arms and B-40 fire and C Company made contact with an estimated enemy platoon size element. The increased enemy action indicated that a major base area had been penetrated and continued disruption of this area may preempt enemy offensive operations in November to the east by the 631st NVA Composite Battalion.

(2) The following OPLANS were published during the reporting period:

(a) OPLAN 69-69, dated 5 August 1969, classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

(b) OPLAN 24-69 (SPREGINS WHITE), dated 12 August 1969, classified SECRET and will not be discussed in this report.

(c) OPLAN 25-69 (STEEL CABLE CHARLIE), dated 19 August 1969, classified SECRET and will not be discussed in this report.

(d) OPLAN 26-69 (STEEL CABLE ALPHA), dated 30 August 1969, classified SECRET and will not be discussed in this report.

(e) OPLAN 183-69, dated 1 October 1969, classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

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(f) OPLAN 27-69, dated 7 September 1969, classified CONFIDENTIAL. This plan outlines actions required of the Division Support Command in the event of damage resulting from enemy attack and/or damage caused by natural disasters to Camp Chari.

(g) OPLAN 28-69 (BLAZE), dated 29 September 1969, classified CONFIDENTIAL. This plan requires the Division to organize and prepare to deploy a 400-man temporary reaction force composed of rear detachment personnel.

(h) OPLAN 30-69, dated 4 October 1969, classified CONFIDENTIAL. The Division would prepare to reinforce artillery positions/FSB's in the BUPRANG/DUC LAP area on order.

(i) OPLAN 29-69 (CHASE), dated 26 October 1969, classified CONFIDENTIAL. The Division reinforces combined defensive forces in the PLEIKU defense complex.

(3) Air Support:

(a) The following close air support missions were flown in support of Operation DAN QUYEN - HINES, 1 August - 31 October 1969:

TYPE MSN	REQ	FLOWN	SORTIE	F4	F100	A1E	AC-47	C119	B-57	A37	A4
FAC PP	2250	990	1985	709	626	102			5	15	518
FAC IMM	275	271	542	210	120	212					
CSS PP	550	141	250	45	87	6					112
CSS IMM	373	103	169	96	73						
SPOOKY	18	18	18				18				
MOONSHINE	6	6	6				6				
SHADOW	8	8	8					8			
C130	8	8	8								
TOTAL	3488	1445	2986	1060	906	320	24	8	5	15	630

(b) Bomb Damage Assessment

TYPE MSN	EST KBA	SEC BKRS	SEC FIRES	SEC EXPL	AA PSN	STRE	ROAD BRDG	CUT
FAC PP	40	74	33	32	2	195	3	12
FAC IMM	106	57	7	8	2	209		1
CSS PP				2				
CSS IMM				3				
TOTAL	146	133	40	45	4	404	3	13

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(a) B-52 Strikes: B-52's struck known base areas, infiltration routes, strong points, and major NVA headquarters. Both Primary and Secondary strikes were delivered in support of Operation DAN QUYEN - HINES. The following figures show the number of strikes carried out during the reporting period:

TYPE MISSION	MSNS	SORTIES
PRIMARY	29	107
SECONDARY	24	63
TOTAL	53	170

(4) Training: The 4th Infantry Training Detachment trained a total of 4,222 US enlisted men, 586 US officers and 156 VIETNAMESE enlisted men during the reporting period.

(a) The Non-commissioned Officer Combat Leadership course graduated 98 students.

(b) The replacement committee trained 3,875 enlisted men and 586 officers.

(c) The Pre-Recon School graduated 135 students. Of these, 19 attended the MACV Recon School.

(d) The Special Training Section trained 39 snipers.

(e) Two special classes on patrolling were conducted for base camp personnel resulting in 33 enlisted graduates.

(f) The Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry received the twelve day reconnaissance course.

(g) The RF/PT and Kit Carson Scout programs continued. RF/PT graduated 112 students and 44 Kit Carson Scouts graduated.

(h) Replacement training will be increased from 3 to 4 days during the next quarter. Additional marksmanship, patrolling, NVA tactics and base camp defense courses will be included.

(5) Chemical.

(a) The Division Chemical Section performed as a staff section and as an operating section. The Chemical Section and 43d Chemical Detachment operated extensively in the employment of Riot Control Agents

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(RCA), supervision and conduct of herbicide operations, and the operation and maintenance of Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) equipment. In addition, training was conducted in CBR readiness and use of standard and field expedient flame weapons. The chemical ASP operated in support of Division missions and also supported Divisional units as required.

(b) TRAILDUST defoliation missions increased over the previous reporting period, while helicopter defoliation missions decreased. The increase in TRAILDUST missions is attributed to improved weather conditions over the area of operations. The majority of TRAILDUST missions were flown in BINH DINH Province, where the monsoon season varies somewhat in occurrence with that of the remainder of the area of operations. The decrease in helicopter defoliation missions is attributed to the lack of herbicides and political clearance. See Inclosure 5 for a summary of defoliation operations.

(1) Generally speaking, herbicides were not sufficiently available through ARVN supply channels in quantities to support extensive helicopter employment.

(2) Beginning 1 July 1969, political clearance for the employment of herbicides was difficult to obtain. At that time, the approved areas in KON Tum, PLEIKU, and BINH DINH Provinces were drastically reduced in size. The Division Chemical Section has prepared a study requesting more extensive areas for employment of herbicides. Partial approval has been obtained, and complete approval is expected.

(c) Riot Control Agent (RCA) munitions were extensively employed in direct support of combat operations and significantly increased the effectiveness of fire support. RCA targets were located by special intelligence activities; necessary clearances were processed by Division Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE); and missions were conducted by the Division Chemical Section. See Inclosure 5 for a summary of RCA operations.

(1) The amount of persistent CS employed nearly tripled over that of the preceding report period. The Chemical Section employed 1,126 drums against targets in the PLAI TRAP Valley, in the vicinity of CHU PRONG Mountain, and VC Valley. Drums were employed by air drop from CH-47 helicopters against infiltration routes, way stations, bunkers, tunnels, and assembly and all living areas to deny their use to the enemy. Intelligence sources indicated major enemy movement away from locations in which bulk CS had been employed.

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were started. At the ARVN Dependent Housing Council held at II Corps Headquarters on 16 September 1969, the lack of progress reported by all units made it clear that the program goals could not be achieved in a reasonable time. As a result of the meeting, DCG, IFFORCEV, sent out a letter on 29 September 1969, that revised the goals both in the current phase and for the future. The revised IFFORCEV goal for Phase I will consist of the total of family units under construction and completed. The 4th Infantry Division revised goal for Phase I is 68 family units with 43 family units already completed and 20 family units under construction. Future goals will be based on available material rather than estimates of its future availability.

(b) Statistics.

(1) The following materials were provided during the period covered by this report:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CEMENT</u>	<u>TIN SHEETS</u>	<u>LUMBER</u>
42d Regiment			
1st Battalion			
2d Battalion			
3d Battalion			
4th Battalion			
2d Ranger Group	120 bags	326	700 (BF)
3d Armored Cavalry	220 bags	—	500 (BF)
Total (Aug, Sep, Oct)	340 bags	326	1,200 (BF)

(2) The following is a total of materials that have been provided to date:

<u>CEMENT</u>	<u>TIN SHEETS</u>	<u>LUMBER BF</u>
4,540 bags	1,624	18,260

(3) Psychological Operations

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(a) Significant Activities

1 During the reporting period the 4th Infantry Division conducted two intensive face-to-face psychological operations campaigns in coordination with GVN PSYOP assets. The first operation was conducted along Highway 19E from LE TRUNG District Headquarters to AN KHE from 25 August to 1 September 1969, and the second operation was conducted on Highway 14 north from PLEIKU to KONTUM from 9-12 September 1969. The objective was to gain the support and confidence of the people. The operations proved to be very effective and assisted in the reduction of enemy mining incidents along both routes. Additionally, the number of villagers who voluntarily reported the locations of enemy mines increased during the period. Also, resistance by the people against VC demands was evidenced by the villagers from KON CHARA. On 12 September 1969, a group of MONTAGNARD villagers from KON CHARA were approached by five VIET CONG tax collectors who demanded 60,000\$VN in taxes. The villagers attacked the VC and killed their leader, with the other four VC rallying to the GVN. The villagers were rewarded for their actions in a special ceremony when they received gifts from the PLEIKU Province Chief, and the 4th Infantry Division.

2 During the reporting period, the Division PSYOP section experienced difficulties in obtaining sufficient air support for leaflets and tape missions, due to the relocation of the Air Force PSYOP support unit from PLEIKU to TUY HOA. However, these initial difficulties were overcome as the new procedures for requesting leaflet missions were formalized with the assistance of the Division Air Liaison Officer and Air Force personnel at TUY HOA. In addition, the PSYOP section now receives air support from a VNAF unit in PLEIKU, and has increased the number of leaflet missions flown by organic helicopter air assets. Of particular significance is the leaflet drops that are made in conjunction with chemical missions over the area. The section has developed a special leaflet to accompany the chemical drops.

3 The Division PSYOP section has selected four Ki Carson Scouts to be trained in the conduct of psychological operations. Two of these individuals receive experience in propaganda warfare while working with the VIET CONG.

4 The Division PSYOP section continued membership in the PLEIKU PSYOP Coordinating Committee, which coordinates all PSYOP activities in the Province. It is at these meetings that Provincial and Division representatives exchange ideas for improving PSYOP programs, and explain particular problem areas that have been encountered. The Chief of the VIETNAMESE Information Service,

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(b) End of Period (31 October 1969).

Authorized - organic units	1,119	195	16,485	17,799
Authorized - attached units	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	1,119	195	16,485	17,799
Assigned - organic units	1,201	199	16,237	17,637
Assigned - attached units	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	1,201	199	16,237	17,637

(2) Replacements: The Division received a total of 576 officer and 5,149 enlisted replacements. During the same period, 634 officers and 6,764 enlisted men rotated out of the Division.

(3) Casualties:

UNIT	HOSTILE			NON-HOSTILE		
	Wounded	Dead	Missing	Wounded	Dead	Missing
1st Bde	272	29	0	30	2	0
2d Bde	140	23	0	69	6	1
3d Bde	72	8	0	46	6	1
DIVARTY	38	3	0	19	3	0
DISCOM	4	1	0	14	0	0
1-10th Cav	24	4	0	23	4	0
1-69th Armor	21	7	0	22	1	0
4th Eng	20	1	0	14	1	0
4th Avn	5	0	0	5	0	0
124th Sig	6	1	0	7	0	0
HHC, 4th Inf Div	0	0	0	0	0	0
4th MP Co	1	0	0	2	0	0

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Scout Dogs	0	0	0	1	0	0
K-75 Inf	10	0	0	1	0	0
FE ME	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	615	77	0	253	23	2

(4) Morale and Personnel Services: Awards and Decorations during the period were presented as follows:

<u>DECORATIONS AWARDED</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>
Distinguished Service Cross	1	0	0
Silver Star	55	53	36
Legion of Merit	8	1	1
Distinguished Flying Cross	5	1	9
Soldiers Medal	14	1	11
Bronze Star (Valor)	246	128	63
Bronze Star (Service)	239	243	193
Air Medal (Valor)	8	5	6
Army Commendation (Valor)	130	59	37
Army Commendation (Service)	1,138	795	433
Purple Heart	143	95	110
Air Medal (Service)	<u>817</u>	<u>546</u>	<u>409</u>
TOTAL	2,004	1,927	1,308

BADGES

Combat Infantry Badge	1,192	1,136	1,102
Combat Medical Badge	82	36	31

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- (b) The Division was visited by four touring soldier shows.
- (c) R&R quotas received were 4,255 out-of-country, and 795 in-country.
- (d) A total of seventy-five 16-mm films circulated within the Division.
- (e) A total of 4,500 personnel checked out 1,200 books from the Special Services Library.

(9) Chaplains Activities: The following services were conducted during the period with the following attendance:

<u>DENOMINATION</u>	<u>NUMBER OF SERVICES</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
Roman Catholic	938	22,688
Protestant	1,897	25,082
Jewish	13	130
Memorial Services	51	2,504

(10) Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order:

- (a) General Courts-Martial: 10
- (b) Special Courts-Martial: 108
- (c) Summary Courts-Martial: 5

(11) Health:

(a) In recent months, skin disease has caused man-day losses. Prevention programs are being initiated and this problem is being monitored closely. Priority is being given to water and clothing resupply. Clean uniforms are being issued about every four days and clean socks every one to two days. Medics have been instructed to inspect the skin of each of their men to reduce this disease wherever possible. Prompt treatment will prevent more serious illness.

(b) In the last several months, a number of animal bites have occurred within the Division. In the month of September, sixty men were treated for animal bites. Animals must be registered and tethered, and a campaign to enforce this has been initiated by the

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Military Police. Continuing emphasis is being placed on rodent control. Personnel are being encouraged to use bed nets as a protective measure against rodents.

g. Engineer

(1) General. During this quarter, the majority of the engineer effort was in direct support of combat operations. All operations of rifle company size or larger included engineer support. Three line companies remained in direct support of the three brigades. One company was in support of the Task Force Commander at Camp Radcliff, while the bridge company supported the Division with tactical bridging, combat engineer vehicles, and assistance with base camp projects.

(2) Operations.

(a) Company A continued in direct support of the 3d Brigade and all attached units at LZ OASIS. Major tasks were road maintenance, drainage, upgrading a Landing Zone (LZ), firebase construction, mine-sweeps and direct combat support. During August and September, a total of 2,447 kilometers of roads was mineswept. The company constructed two LZ's and upgraded four.

(b) Company B remained in direct support of the 1st Brigade operating out of Camp Radcliff. Major effort was expended in direct support missions to infantry battalions involving development of fire support bases and LZ's, bunker destruction and road maintenance. In addition, with one land clearing team from HHC, 10 kilometers of road were cleared from Highway 19 north on highway 503.

(c) Company C remained in support of the 2d Brigade throughout the reporting period. The company operated out of FSB MARY LOU, until 21 September 1969. The company then moved to LZ HARDTIMES. On 23 October 1969, the company moved to LZ ENGLISH in the vicinity of BONG SON. Considerable effort was expended by the company in upgrading LZ's and maintaining roads to battalions and LZ's. The 2d platoon worked in the vicinity of LZ PENNY with one HHC land clearing team to finish a bunker destruction mission. At the conclusion of the mission, over 7,000 bunkers had been destroyed. The majority of operations by the platoons with infantry battalions consisted of bunker destruction, constructing LZ's and upgrading FSB's.

(d) Company D, during the period 1 August through 20 October 1969, was involved both in a direct and general support role. The

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2d platoon was in DS of 1-22d Infantry and later 3-12th Infantry until 23 September. The other platoons were in GS of Camp Radcliff. Typical tasks at Camp Radcliff included construction of a mine boom, repairing roads and S4 yards. On 24 September, the 2d platoon was assigned the task of rebuilding and repairing bridge security structures on Highway 19.

(e) Company E gave general engineer support to the Division with tactical bridging, minesweep, base camp construction, convoy security, resupply hauling and transportation. Company E's bridging support consisted of a 38' x 4" dry span located west of KONTUM on the route to POLBU KRONG and various AVLB missions within the Division AO. The CEV with the mine roller attachment was employed in minesweeps along routes from LZ OASIS to FSB's in the 3d Brigade area of operation. One platoon was responsible for fifteen construction projects in support of Camp Enari in addition the disassembly of one brigade FSB at MARY LOU in the vicinity of KONTUM. Bridge trucks from the company were used to haul supplies and personnel in support of engineer and tactical units. In addition, ten dump trucks assigned to Company E were used to haul rock and sand from PLEIKU and KONTUM respectively, to fire support bases in the Division area of operations.

h. Army Aviation Operations

(1) Operational totals of the 4th Aviation Battalion were as follows:

	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Hours Flown	3,241	3,029	2,926	9,196
Sorties	11,044	9,443	8,341	28,828
Troops Lifted	15,986	12,955	10,852	39,793
Tons of Cargo	283	225	142	650
Aircraft Damaged	4	9	4	17
Aircraft Destroyed	0	2	0	2

(2) The average number of aircraft per day used in support of the 4th Infantry Division was:

28 UH-1H, 12 UH-1C/AH-1C, 3 OH-6A, 4 CH-47, 1 CH-54

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1. Inspector General

(1) Fourth Division Annual General Inspections of two divisional units were conducted. Courtesy inspections in preparation for the USARV AGI were conducted in fifteen (15) units, and fourteen (14) reinspections were made. The 4th Infantry Division received its Annual General Inspection by HQ's, USARV.

(2) No complaints were received by this office during the reporting period. Three hundred and twenty-seven requests for assistance were received during this period.

j. Signal

(1) General: Operational activities continued to focus upon providing multichannel communications in support of the Division and its elements.

(2) Operations:

(a) On 22 September 1969, elements of Company B were deployed in support of a 2d Brigade TAC CP at LZ HARDTIMES. Operations ended on 23 October 1969.

(b) On 18 October 1969, the headquarters of Company B deployed to Camp Radcliff at AN KHE.

(c) On 26 October 1969, elements of Company B were deployed to LZ ENGLISH in support of the 2d Brigade move to that area. Elements of HHC and Company A were deployed on 27 October 1969, to assist in wiring in the 2d Brigade Headquarters.

(d) On 28 October 1969, the 3d Brigade moved from LZ Oasis to Camp Enari. One VHF system was discontinued. Elements of Company B were moved to Camp Enari.

(e) On 30 October 1969, multichannel communications to LZ MARY LOU were terminated. Elements of Company B supporting this operation returned to AN KHE.

k. Information Activities

(1) During the period 1 August - 31 October 1969, a total of 18 news correspondents visited the Division AO, covering a variety of subjects ranging from pure hometown and human interest material to the Division's active combat and pacification operations. Included in the

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(b) Evaluation: Unnecessary additional damage and casualties result when individuals and vehicles move through an area before a thorough search upon the initial location of one mine. Mine detectors fail to pick up mines in culverts.

(c) Recommendations: Upon discovery or denotation of a mine a thorough visual and mechanical search should be made 200 meters in all directions around the location of the first mine. ~~Visual~~ visual search around all culverts should be included as part of mine sweep operations.

(3) Enemy Cache Sites

(a) Observations: Enemy units continually use the same areas for way stations and resupply/cache sites.

(b) Evaluations: The enemy is forced to frequent the same areas due to his lack of navigational equipment, i.e. compasses, maps. Therefore, the enemy must use natural terrain to locate his caches and way stations.

(c) Recommendations: Units should periodically check areas of known cache and strong points from past experience. Natural terrain features such as caves, thick underbrush and draws should be searched in detail.

(4) Area Searches

(a) Observations: When a major contact is made with the enemy, invariably, the enemy will have a cache close by.

(b) Evaluations: Supplies are very precious to the enemy and therefore a fairly strong security force is employed to guard the supplies. The units will fight to evacuate or defend the supplies.

(c) Recommendations: When a unit is engaged, a detailed search of the contact area should be made for caches once the enemy breaks contact or is overpowered.

c. Operations.

(1) Marking of Enemy Base Camps

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(a) Observation: A battalion discovered a large base camp complex of bunkers and caves.

(b) Evaluation: The tactical situation precluded a thorough search of the complex and the battalion moved to another location. When the tactical situation permitted, the battalion returned to the general area of the enemy base camp but was unable to find the exact location due to the dense jungle.

(c) Recommendation: When an enemy base camp or fortification is found and a thorough search cannot be made, the area should be marked to insure friendly location of the site when a thorough search can be made. Marking material preferably should be visible from the air and relatively permanent in nature, such as International Orange Paint.

(2) Sapper Attacks

(a) Observation: During this period enemy operations stressed sapper attacks and the sapper attacks are expected to continue.

(b) Evaluation: Sapper attacks are preceded by detailed reconnaissance to include identifying anti-intrusion devices and determining the extent of protective wire. This may take place 3 to 7 days prior to the attack and is followed by attack rehearsals. The night before a sapper attack, the enemy will neutralize obstacles by tying down trip flares, mines, etc., and will approach within a few hundred meters of the position. After dark they will slowly work their way through the wire using the least likely avenues of approach along low ground. Sapper attacks usually take place between 2400 and 0200 hours. They may be preceded by mortar fire to get US troops to move inside bunkers. The sapper attack will be quick with one or two squads heading for predetermined targets such as ammo storage, artillery positions, or CP's. Half of the sappers will be armed with 7 to 14 CHICOM grenades and up to 20 kilograms of TNT. The other sappers will have AK-47's.

(c) Recommendation: That all personnel familiarize themselves with current sapper tactics and techniques.

(3) ROKA Search Techniques

(a) Observation: ROKA forces have been extremely successful in searching out enemy forces and materiel.

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(b) Evaluation: Good intelligence is the basis for the formulation, execution, and excellent results of ROKA search operations. Intelligence includes prior knowledge of the enemy, his disposition and strength, a terrain analysis, and long range/continuous weather forecasts. A typical ROKA area of operations during a search normally consists of a 2000 meter radius circle cordoning the bulk of the enemy force within the AO. A maximum amount of troops use thorough search techniques, slowly tightening the cordon by moving 50 to 100 meters a day. As the cordon tightens, ROKA troops, forced to leave the cordon due to the shrinking circle, form a second cordon concentrating on suspect areas, ridges, possible exfiltration routes (blue lines), and likely avenues of approach of an enemy counterattack. A third cordon is often provided by a reserve force. The techniques of patience and meticulous search of every meter of the objective area saves lives and insures complete clearance. The ROKA soldier often moves along on his haunches in a half duck waddle with the M16 at the ready under his right arm while he searches above, below, right and left with his left hand, always observing. This is slow and it tries the patience of the individual and the commanders of each level who must refrain from pressing speed. Its casualty saving quality and thoroughness are the pay off. ROKA troops carry light combat loads during search operations. Small arms, LAW's, and 60-mm mortars are followed by heavier weaponry; flamethrowers, 106-mm recoilless rifles, 81-mm mortars, 55 gallon drums of napalm (with connecting pipe to pump the napalm into caves and tunnel complexes and ignited with flamethrowers or fire), and quad .50 caliber machineguns. One day's spare rations necessitate daily resupply. Following a ROKA search, operation a "stay behind" task force conducts mop up operations. Sweeps are conducted to pick up enemy stragglers. Enemy cache areas are re-searched, marked, and fortifications are destroyed. Critiques are conducted down to the squad level following ROKA search missions stressing new and old lessons learned. The success of ROKA search operations using the above techniques is accentuated by continued successful operations against the enemy.

(c) Recommendation: All commanders, when feasible, should emulate the successful example of the ROKA forces.

(4) Close Artillery Support

(a) Observation: Ground forces have a tendency to rely on air-ground fire (especially helicopter gunships) to support units in

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contact rather than close artillery support.

(b) Evaluation: Each enemy contact presents a challenge to the leader on the ground level to evaluate and apply proper combat resources. Informal queries indicate that the general consensus of opinion leading to the call for gunships is related to clearance times, safety restrictions and what appears to be a "carte blanche" authority for anyone in the area to checkfire the artillery.

(c) Recommendations: That use of artillery as the most responsive means of fire support be emphasized and that small unit leaders receive continuous training calling for and adjusting artillery. That this training emphasize the use of continuing adjustment as the unit moves so that fires can very quickly be adjusted to the contact area. This eliminates some of the safety restrictions. That schemes of maneuver and gun-target lines be considered in advance and that "check-fire" authority be limited to senior ground commanders in the area and air routes and corridors be formally established and adhered to.

(5) Enemy Detection

(a) Observation: The enemy seems to retain the ability to engage friendly company and battalion bases.

(b) Evaluation: On numerous occasions during the reporting period, friendly bases were attacked at ranges from 35 to 50 meters and on one occasion a FSB was penetrated.

(c) Conclusion: That small unit leaders be constantly reminded that active, aggressive use of a combination of SRP's, LP's, and local patrolling are the best defense against base camp probes and attacks.

(6) Engaging the Enemy

(a) Observations: On too many occasions, contact with the enemy follows a format of:

- (1) Contact established.
- (2) Artillery and/or gunships called.
- (3) Areas swept with negative results.

(b) Evaluation: While the decision of the best way to engage the enemy must be left to the commander on the ground, when contact is the result of a meeting engagement and the enemy is not dug in aggressive fire and maneuver to close with and kill or capture the enemy

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by fire and maneuver would produce more meaningful results and battlefield intelligence.

(c) Recommendation: That small unit leaders be constantly reminded that aggressive offensive tactics using organic firepower usually produce the best results and are likely to reduce rather than increase friendly casualties.

(7) Hipshoot

(a) Observations: Many times intelligence reports indicated a lucrative enemy target within a battalion's AO but out of supporting artillery range. To capitalize on these opportunities, a short duration FSB consisting of from two to three tubes of artillery secured by a rifle platoon can be established to support such an operation.

(b) Evaluation: When targets of opportunity present themselves outside a unit's supporting artillery fan, effective operations can be directed against them by displacing two or three tubes of artillery to a small FSB to support the operation. This FSB can be secured by a rifle platoon supplemented by artillery personnel. It should be recognized that this FSB is for a short period of time only.

(c) Recommendation: Commanders give consideration to employing short duration FSB's against targets of opportunity outside their supporting artillery fans.

(8) Land Navigation

(a) Observation: Platoon and squad leaders tend to rely on the company commander for land navigation.

(b) Evaluation: Leaders who are not constantly aware of their positions on the ground are losing valuable experience in terrain analysis and more importantly are not prepared to take control of their element should something happen to the element leader.

(c) Conclusion: Commanders should continually quiz subordinates about locations while the unit moves to insure that all leaders are aware of their ground location.

(9) Carrying Ammunition

(a) Observation: Soldiers frequently carry machine gun ammunition Pancho Villa style over their shoulders and pack.

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(b) Evaluation: During stream crossings this method of carrying ammunition creates a definite safety hazard because the ammunition will keep the pack attached to the body of the man even if he succeeds in dropping his pack.

(c) Recommendation: Unit leaders should insure that M-60 ammunition is carried in such a way that it cannot impede the soldier when he drops his pack.

(10) Stay Behind Ambush Squad

(a) Observation: VC and NVA will frequently trail moving US forces.

(b) Evaluation: When the enemy is following US forces he usually will stay 300 to 500 meters behind the rear security.

(c) Recommendation: Before an element moves to a new location they should have pre-planned an ambush squad. This squad should be dropped off at likely ambush sites while the company continues to move. This practice also gives a bulk of the element knowledge of their location in case they have to be reinforced.

(11) Aerial Observation for Armor

(a) Observation: Often while moving through dense jungle terrain, tanks have difficulty selecting a route which will minimize obstacles.

(b) Evaluation: Aerial observation has assisted greatly in directing the lead element to avoid obstacles and impossible terrain. This can overcome the navigational problems experienced when observation is restricted on the ground to a distance of 10 to 20 meters.

(c) Recommendation: Aerial support should be made available to armor units conducting operations in jungle and other restricted terrain.

(12) Tank Recovery

(a) Observation: When tanks become stuck or damaged by mines great distances from normal lines of communication, a major recovery problem is developed.

(b) Evaluation: In areas where the water table is close to the surface combat vehicles become mired because they have broken through

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the thin, hard earth layer. Junior leaders often do not realize the magnitude of their problem and attempt to recover the vehicle using conventional techniques which assume that hardstand is nearby. In most cases these recovery efforts are a waste of time and energy and do not free the vehicle free without outside assistance.

(c) Conclusion: In addition to intensified training of vehicle commanders to recognize and avoid such areas, emphasis must be placed on early request for assistance. The junior leader should make his best attempt at recovering the vehicle but should that fail he should immediately request the assistance of a senior recovery specialist and provide a list of materials that he feels necessary for successful recovery. These items should be assembled while the specialist is enroute. Upon arrival at the scene, the specialist makes his analysis and calls for the waiting material and submits his request for security forces, engine and other requirements to complete the entire operation. This action immediately focuses command attention on the problem and greatly reduces the amount of wasted time and effort that results when assistance is piecemealed to the operator.

(13) Tanks in the Indirect Fire Role

(a) Observation: Use of M48A3 Tank in indirect fire role.

(b) Evaluation: There are many problems encountered in emphasizing M48A3 tanks in an indirect fire role. These problems include accuracy of fire, extensive wear on the 90-mm gun tube and reducing the mobile aspect of armor. The problem of accuracy of fire stems from the fact that the projectile fired has a fixed charge and the weapon itself has a relatively flat trajectory. Compensation for range is made only by adjusting the elevation of the gun. Since the weapon has a flat trajectory - intermediate hill masses between gun and target cannot be overcome as it can when firing artillery where the elevation and charge accounts for range. The second problem of extensive wear is important; the tube life of the 90-mm gun is relatively low compared to indirect fire weapons. Approximately 1,400 rounds of HE will wear out a 90-mm gun whereas the tube life of most artillery pieces is 5,000 to 6,000 rounds. The third problem is a violent reduction of combat power. Tanks were designed to maneuver, employing them in an indirect fire role, the tank is in an immobile position. Notwithstanding, however, the tank in an indirect fire role provides a valuable supplement to other indirect weapons for area type coverage with a large volume of fire.

(c) Recommendation: If tanks must be employed in the

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indirect fire role. FO's should be used to adjust the fire. Due to the ballistic characteristics of the gun and ammunition, it must be realized that the use of tanks firing indirect is very limited.

(14) Reaction to Fire

(a) Observation: During the initial volley of incoming fire, most everyone took cover in bunkers and fighting positions.

(b) Evaluation: During any type of attack, massive volumes of fire must be returned immediately with whatever weapons are available. In order to control, direct, or shift these fires, leaders and key personnel must be out evaluating the situation first hand. At the inception of the attack on GYPSY, about 50% of the fighting strength were outside their bunkers. After initial incoming individuals were firing, communicating, and assisting in evacuation of the wounded. Although soldiers outside bunkers increased the probability of casualties, the activity was absolutely necessary for gun crews to deliver accurate fires and for medical personnel to render aid to the wounded.

(c) Recommendation: The number of personnel outside bunkers should be kept to a minimum, consistent with what must be accomplished. Leaders must be out directing efforts and evaluating the situation.

(15) Direct Artillery Fire

(a) Observation: A battery employed direct fire against muzzle flashes during an attack on a fire support base.

(b) Evaluation: The Battery CO spotted the flash of the third round fired by the enemy. The line of sight from the gun to target was obstructed in some areas by latrines, equipment racks, and engineer stakes. Observers were posted near the gun pits and directed fire within three minutes after receiving the first incoming round.

(c) Recommendation: Structures within the 105-mm howitzer direct fire sectors should be constructed below gun pit wall level or moved to allow unhampered direct fires. Latrines and showers should be fabricated to be toppled easily. When definable, enemy targets present themselves during an attack, controlled suppressive fires must be immediately employed. Suppressive fires must continuously be delivered on observed enemy targets.

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

1. (C) Task Organization as of 31 July 1969 with supporting forces.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-8 Inf
3-12 Inf
3-3 Inf
2-8 Inf (-)
1-69 Armor (-)
2-1 Cav (-)
A/7-17 Cav
6-29 Arty DS
A/2-17 Arty DS
B/2-17 Arty DS
C/5-16 Arty GSR 6-29 Arty
B/4 Engr
D/704th Maint
B/4 Med
Plat/B/124 Sig
Plat/4 MP Co
TACP

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-14 Inf
1-35 Inf
2-35 Inf
1-10 Cav
D/2-1 Cav
2-9 Arty DS
C/3-6 Arty GS
C/5-27 Arty GS
D/5-16 Arty GS
A/6-14 Arty GS
A/5-16 Arty GSR 2-9 Arty
D/4 Engr
B/704 Maint
D/4 Med
Plat/B/124 Sig
Plat/4 MP Co
TACP

173d Abn Bde

C/7-17 Cav (OPCON)

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

B/2-3 Inf
1-12 Inf
1-22 Inf
B/7-17 Cav
B/1-69 Armor
4-42 Arty DS (-)
A/3-6 Arty DS
A/4-42 Arty GS
C/6-14 Arty GS
A/1-92 Arty GS
B/1-92 Arty GS
B/5-16 Arty GSR Arty 4-42 A
C/4 Engr
C/704 Maint
C/4 Med
Plat/C/124 Sig
Plat/4 MP Co
TACP

Division Troops

4th Engr (-)
D/7-17 Cav
B/3-6 Arty GS
B/6-14 Arty GS
C/1-92 Arty GS
C/7-15 Arty GS
4 Avn
124 Sig (-)
4 MP Co (-)
K/75 Inf (Ranger)
4 MI Det
4 War Dog (Prov)
43 Chem Det
29 Mil Hist Det
TACP

2. (C) Task Organization change as noted in significant events 5 Aug 69

Inclosure 1

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
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
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Authority: FOI b7D
By: MP NARS, Date: 11/16/83



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
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Incl 4



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4th Infantry Division Area of Operation



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LOCATIONS OF LZ'S, VILLAGES, FSB'S

AN KHE	BR465467
AN LAO VALLEY	BR685430 N to BR 6264
BASE AREA 202	BR130307
BASE AREA 226	BR7263
BASE AREA 702	YA0975
CAME RADCLIFF	BR465467
CHU PA MTS	YA9568
CHU PRONG MTS	AR765680
GROWS FOOT	BR7277
DAK AYUNH	AR9528
DAK PAYOU VALLEY	BR1339
DAK PEK	YB6896
DUC LAP	YU8756
FSB APRIL	ZA058409
FSB ARMAGE DON	BR420645
FSB MEREDITH	YA916277
FSB OASIS	ZA114275
FSB POWDER	BS637179
FSB PUMA	ZA079218
FSB SHERIDA	BR690558
HILL 666	BR398690
IA DRANG VALLEY	ZA8007 E to ZA9007
LE TRUNG	AR9247
LZ ABBY	BR747818
LZ ACTION	BR264470
LZ AQUARIUS	BR457600

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LZ ARMAGEDDON	BR420645
LZ ARNOLD TRAIL	BR726607
LZ AUGUSTIA	BR801727
LZ BAXTER	BR185719
LZ BIG MINDY	BR158244
LZ BLACKHAWK	BR035535
LZ BRIGIT	Zn015164
LZ BUCKEYE	BR078276
LZ BURGESS	YA901386
LZ CAJUN	BR372921
LZ CHALLENGE	BR628822
LZ COMMANCHE	YA432631
LZ CONQUEST	YA601401
LZ COURAGE	CH023725
LZ CURAHNE	YA427525
LZ DENISE	BR520512
LZ DORIS	BR061342
LZ DRAGON	YA443059
LZ EMELIA	BR477595
LZ ENGLISH	BS877077
LZ FRUSTRATION	BR273462
LZ HARD TIMES	BR613607
LZ HIPSHOOT	ZA187112
LZ HOOPER	BS483074
LZ INVASION	YA598445
LZ JACKSON HOLE	YA902315
LZ JOHN HENRY	DR674708

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LZ KIOWA	BR337657
LZ LANCE	BR278749
LZ LAURA KAY	AR953396
LZ LEWIS	BR534973
LZ LORI	BR929756
LZ LOUIS	BR531971
LZ MARTY	BR074430
LZ MATTIE	BR225238
LZ NIAGARA	BR421820
LZ NUTMEG	BR224380
LZ OUTRIDER	ZA204214
LZ PAULA	BR439408
LZ PHILLIPS	YA488639
LZ PLUTO	BR615643
LZ PONY	BR808832
LZ RAQUEL	BR506903
LZ RIPTLE	ZA205726
LZ SCHUELLER	BR367458
LZ SHERRY	BR490690
LZ SNIFE	BR693613
LZ SOMER	BR331273
LZ SPEARHEAD	YA519471
LZ ST GEORGE	ARB54144
LZ SUSIE	BR478908
LZ TERRACE	BR572753
LZ TOUGHIE	BR533630
LZ TRACER	AR846592

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LZ TWO BITS

BR845945

LZ UFLIFT

BR927757

LZ UTE

BR355705

LZ WARRIOR

BR322558

LZ WELCH

BR494879

LZ WILDCAT

YA595525

MANG YANG PASS

BR2251

PHU MY

BR9467

PLEI KRONG

ZA113673

PLEI TRAP VALLEY

YB8815 to YA6347

ROCKET BOX

ZA145535

SONG BA RIVER

BR4745 SW to BR345285 S to PHU NHON

VC VALLEY

BR1339

VINH THANH VALLEY

BR6251

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY (BINH TUY #1)

1. (C) Summary of Personnel and Equipment Losses

US KIA	43
US WIA	118
NVA KIA	212
NVA CIA	7
Weapons and Equipment	
CS Weapons	20
SA Weapons	859
Rice CIA	591 tons
Structures Destroyed	2,157
Ammunition	10,797 Rounds SA
	717 Rounds Mortar
	141 Rounds Recoilless Rifle
	612 Grenades
	224 Rounds B-40

2. (C) Casualty Causes

a. Friendly Casualties

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>
Ground Contact (Frd Initiated)	9	18
Ground Contact (Enemy Initiated)	20	65
Ground Contact at an LZ	1	9
Sapper Attack	2	6
Ground to Air Fire	6	8
Non-Battle Casualties	5	12
Total	43	118

b. Enemy Casualties

Air Cavalry	30
Tac Air/B-52	48
C/75 Ranger	16
Ground Contact	118
Artillery	UNDIM
Total	212

~~Inlosure 6~~

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