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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-GC-NH

20 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

S&S DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

a. General

(1) During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division continued its participation in Operation DAN QUYEN-HINAS.

(2) Organizational Structure. Task Organization, Operation HINAS, 1 May 1970 to 31 July 1970, is set forth in Inclosure 1.

(3) Commanders and major staff as of the end of the reporting period are listed at Inclosure 2.

(4) Locations, coordinates of villages, LZ's, and FSB's are listed at Inclosure 5.

(5) Mission: The 4th Infantry Division conducted operations to support GVN pacification programs; to locate, pursue and destroy VC/NVA elements attempting to disrupt pacification; to screen routes of infiltration along the CAMBODIAN border; to locate and destroy enemy resources, installations and command facilities in CAMBODIA; and to secure the major LOC within its area of operation.

(6) Concept of Operation: At the beginning of the period, the division had one brigade operating to the north of Camp Radcliff targeted against the GIA LAI Provincial unit, and one brigade was operating to the south in the DAK PAYOU Valley against the 95B Regiment. CAMBODIAN border screening operations were conducted preliminary to division operations in CAMBODIAN Base Area 702. In support of ARVN operations in CAMBODIA the division provided the support of two infantry battalions in the PLEI TRAP Valley. Highway 19, the major LOC in the division area of operation, was secured with a minimum of one cavalry squadron, and one brigade began an IFTV directed mission in eastern BINH DINH Province in support of the pacification effort.

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AVDDH-GC-111

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

b. Intelligence

(1) General

(a) Enemy activity in BINH DINH and PLEIKU Provinces during May consisted of scattered sapper attacks, attacks by fire, and attacks against lines of communication. These offensive actions were taken to weaken and delay allied operations being conducted in enemy base areas located in CAMBODIA. Sapper attacks and attacks by fire were conducted against division support elements and Highway 19 was interdicted on both sides of PLEIKU in an effort to retard the movement of men and supplies. In Base Area 702, enemy resistance to 4th Infantry Division operations ranged from non-existent to moderate. According to documents captured in CAMBODIA, the enemy had warning as early as 17 March 1970 of the probability of friendly operations, and had moved much of his stockpile of supplies deeper into CAMBODIA. Contacts were fought with stay-behind elements and with enemy units guarding supplies that had not been withdrawn. Several large caches and medical facilities showed that even with prior warning the enemy had not been able to remove his troops and supplies to safety.

(b) During June, enemy activity was light in both BINH DINH and PLEIKU Provinces. Division elements operated in Base Area 202 against the 95B Regiment and north of AN KHE against elements of the 3d NVA Division. Enemy forces avoided contact with division units and concentrated on resupply and the disruption of pacification. There were two large engagements during the month, one in each of the operational areas which resulted in over 50 enemy killed, three captured and one HOI CHANH. Enemy activity decreased in all forms after its highpoint of the previous month.

(c) In July, activity in BINH DINH Province remained light while increasing in PLEIKU Province to a moderate level. Enemy activity in both provinces indicated that large numbers of replacements were being infiltrated to various units in the division area of operation. North of AN KHE, three infiltration groups were identified, while CIDG units in the PLEI MA area engaged a fourth. Division units were targeted against these groups, plus the 95B Regiment, the 2d Regiment, and elements of the 3d NVA Division. In BINH DINH Province the enemy generally continued to avoid contact, but in PLEIKU a moderate increase began the latter part of the month with attacks by fire against several major installations.

(2) PLEIKU

Activity in PLEIKU Province was moderate during May as 4th Infantry Division and allied units launched operations into enemy sanctuaries in CAMBODIA. Division elements experienced ground to air

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVD JR-GC-NH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

fire and met sporadic contact during the initial landings in CAMBODIA. During the remainder of the operation, enemy elements attempted to avoid US forces. Several large medical facilities were found, over 500 tons of rice was captured, and on 12 May, a weapons cache containing over 800 weapons was found. After 4th Division units withdrew from the CAMBODIAN phase of the operation, ARVN rangers made contact with a large enemy force in a regimental size base camp, resulting in over 40 NVA soldiers being killed and 2000 mortar and 500 B-40 rocket rounds being captured. On 24 May, the ARVN rangers engaged a large enemy force, resulting in 31 enemy KIA and one prisoner. To the south, in Base Area 701, ARVN units captured three 75mm pack howitzers, eleven 75mm RR and numerous small arms. A PW captured in this base area identified the 6th Battalion, 24th Regiment as being located there and told of a "K7" Battalion, 24th Regiment which had been formed in September 1969. Operations conducted by the 4th Division in the lower FLEI TRAP Valley after withdrawing from CAMBODIA resulted in 17 NVA killed in a number of engagements.

In the vicinity of FLEIKU City, the K631st Composite Battalion attacked the city with 122mm rockets, and 82mm mortars, and in addition interdicted Highway 19 west of the city with attacks by fire. On 4 May, LZ OASIS received 32 rounds of mixed 75mm RR and 82mm mortar fire. To the east of the city, LE TRUNG District Headquarters received 107mm rockets twice.

Action in FLEIKU Province remained light during June, as division elements operated in Base Area 202 against the 95B Regiment. The most significant incident occurred when D/1-14th Inf observed 70 enemy soldiers crossing an open field. Artillery, gunships, and tactical air were employed in support of the ground unit resulting in 28 enemy killed. To the east of the base area, a cache was found containing a 57mm RR, a 60mm mortar and ammunition for both weapons. Activity along Highway 19 decreased as allied troops withdrew from CAMBODIA. The largest incident occurred west of FLEIKU where the 2d Battalion (Mech), 8th Infantry was probed in a night location by an unknown size enemy force. Employing organic weapons, the alert 2-8th killed two NVA, and while sweeping the next morning found many blood trails leading away from the area.

Activity increased during July as enemy forces attacked RF/PF forces to the north and west of FLEIKU City, and the 95B Regiment and K631st Composite Battalion were identified southwest of FLEIKU. In the FLEI MRONG area, RF's engaged an unknown size enemy force. While sweeping after the contact, four VMC and four 122mm rockets were captured. The rockets were intended for the artillery company of the 408th Sapper Battalion. To the southwest of FLEIKU in the FLEI ME area, CIDG forces engaged small enemy forces throughout the month. PW's and captured documents identified these enemy troops as the 2201 Infiltration Group.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division <sup>20 August 70</sup>  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Other PW's and documents identified the K1 Battalion, 95B Regiment and the K631st Battalion. These units will conduct joint operations in that area in the future. On 16 July, Camp Snari received 23 rounds of mixed 122mm rocket and 82mm mortar fire from the south and southwest. At the same time a village to the south of Camp Snari received 75mm RR fire. The next night the CIDG camp at PLEI ME received 82mm mortar fire. Along Highway 19, both east and west of PLEIKU City, enemy activity was light and limited to mining incidents and harassing fire.

### (3) BINH DINH

Enemy activity in BINH DINH Province was light during May as 4th Division units conducted operations in CAMBODIA. Enemy actions consisted of harassing actions against lines of communication and against the 4th Infantry Division base camp at Camp Radcliff. During this period Camp Radcliff received two attacks by fire and two sapper attacks. On 11 May, the camp received 18 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and on 16 May received eight additional rounds. The two sapper attacks were targeted against the 704th Maintenance Battalion and resulted in damage to vehicles and buildings. Upon return from CAMBODIA, elements of the 2d Brigade deployed north of AN KHE to operate against the C2/407th Sapper Battalion. The only enemy initiated incident during the operation was an attack by fire against LZ KIOWA consisting of ten rounds of 60mm mortar fire.

Activity decreased in BINH DINH during June as units from the 2d Brigade engaged an infiltration group and killed 29 enemy, captured three and one HOI CHANH. The PW's identified their unit as the 2d Training Regiment, and documents captured at the site of the contact identified the infiltration group as the D1122 Group. Food caches found during the month totaled 45,948 pounds of rice. A clothing storage area also was found containing 500 pounds of clothes including several ROK and US uniforms. On 30 June, elements of the 1-14th Infantry discovered a large NVA base camp that was believed to have been a 3d NVA Division Headquarters due to the complexity and variety of the structures found. It was estimated to have been used within the previous two days by 300-400 people. Enemy activity against US fire support bases consisted of harassing and small arms fire and one 60mm mortar attack against LZ TERRACE. Along Highway 19, interdiction attempts were light except for a contact on 20 June in the ROK area of operation that resulted in several US vehicles being damaged or destroyed.

During July, enemy units in BINH DINH Province generally continued to avoid contact with the 4th Infantry Division, and placed their emphasis on the food procurement, resupply, and disruption of pacification. The largest action of the month occurred on 23-24 July when aviation elements spotted an unknown size enemy force. Artillery, gunships, tactical air, and maneuver elements of the 4th Infantry Division were

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CONFIDENTIAL**

20 August 70

AVDDH-GC-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

employed which resulted in 43 enemy killed. The enemy carried documents that identified them as members of the 1126 Infiltration Group. On 6 July a PW was captured as he was leading replacements to the 50th LF Battalion. Documents captured at the same time as the PW identified his replacements as being from the D1122 Infiltration Group, the same group that was engaged by the 1-22d Infantry in June. Other documents captured during the month told of a 230 man group that would cross "a highway" on 10 July on their way to PHU YEN Province. Later in the month, two deserters from an infiltration group were captured and they identified their group as the 250th Infantry Battalion. This evidence indicates that the enemy may be making a major effort to build up his units prior to September, possibly for a new offensive.

(4) Estimated enemy composition, disposition, and strength as of 31 July 1970:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ESTIMATED STRENGTH</u>	<u>PROBABLE LOCATION</u>
3d NVA Division Headquarters	2400	Northern BINH DINH
12th Regiment	1310	Base Area 226
2d VC Regiment	950	Northern BA 226
500th Transportation Battalion	350	North of BA 226
95B Regiment	700	Base Area 202
L-45 LF Battalion	200	South of Camp Nhari
408th Sapper Battalion	300	Northeast of FLEIKU
H-15 LF Battalion	200	East of Camp Nhari
243d Trans Battalion	300	Northwest of AN KHE
K631st Composite Battalion	300	West of FLEIKU
Infra Structure	4235	
Guerilla Forces	1000	
Total Enemy Forces	12245+	

(5) Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques

(a) A PW captured in FLEIKU Province has indicated that the K1 Battalion, 95B Regiment is to interdict Highway 19 west of FLEIKU. This is a new mission for the K1 Battalion, and in an area further north than this battalion normally operates. The same PW has stated that the K631st Composite Battalion will work with the K1 Battalion in some future operations in unknown locations.

(b) During operations in CAMBODIA, it was noted that most LZ's had huts on them and fences built around them. It was later proven that the enemy had built these huts to make US forces believe that these areas were inhabited. Actually only two LZ watchers would live in the huts and report any attempted insertions on their LZ.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (H2) (U)

(6) Recapitulation of Enemy Battle Losses

(a) Personnel:	KIA (BC)	380
	NVA CIA	13
	VC/VMC CIA	4
(b) Weapons:	SA	880
	CS	41
(c) Ammunition:	SA rounds	15,372
	CS rounds	1,430
	Grenades	761
	Mines	158

(d) Miscellaneous Captured Items:

Rice	590.5 tons
Documents	397,460 pages

(7) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Probably Courses of Action:

(a) Capabilities

1 The 2d VC Regiment, 3d NVA Division, has the capability to conduct multi-battalion sized attacks against allied installations, base camps, and populated areas in the PHU MY District.

2 The 12th Regiment, 3d NVA Division, has the capability to conduct multi-battalion attacks against allied installations, base camps, and populated areas supported by 122mm rockets. They can also interdict Highway 19 from AN KHE to the coast.

3 The 953 Regiment is capable of conducting up to battalion size attacks against Highway 19, fire support bases, and GVN villages.

4 The 408th Sapper Battalion is capable of conducting multi-company size sapper attacks supported by 107mm rockets, and attacks by fire against allied and GVN installations in the PLAIKU area.

5 The K631st Composite Battalion is capable of conducting multi-company attacks supported by mortars, recoilless rifle, and 122mm rockets, and attacks by fire against allied installations, villages, and lines of communication west of PLAIKU City, and upon the city itself.

(b) Enemy Vulnerabilities

1 Enemy units are subject to airstrikes, and artillery fire while moving, in bivouac, or massing for an attack.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

2 Enemy munitions and food caches are vulnerable to allied search and clear operations.

3 Enemy movement can be detected by airborne and ground sensor devices.

4 Enemy bivouac sites can be located by airborne personnel detection and red haze detection devices.

5 Enemy lines of communication are overextended and subject to interdiction by allied forces.

6 Low morale, personnel losses, and shortages of food and medical supplies provide an excellent climate for psychological warfare operations.

(c) Probable Courses of Action

1 The enemy will probably continue to attempt to resupply, replace, and retrain his personnel in preparation for possible offensives in the fall.

2 The 2d Regiment will probably move to the VINH THANH Valley area to receive replacements and conduct retraining.

3 The 12th Regiment will probably continue to interdict Highway 19 east of AN KHE, disrupt pacification, and possibly attempt to procure food in the THU CAT area.

4 Local forces in BINH DINH will probably continue to harass the pacification program and conduct psychological operations against allied units.

5 In FLEIKU Province, the K631st Composite Battalion will probably continue attacks by fire against friendly installations and harassment of villages and RF/PF forces.

6 The 408th Sapper Battalion will probably continue its attacks against FLEIKU City and LE TRUNG District Headquarters.

7 The 95B Regiment will probably continue to interdict Highway 19 between AN KHE and FLEIKU and possibly harass GVN villages in conjunction with local force units.

8 Local force units will probably continue harassment of lines of communication, providing intelligence for main force units, and disrupting pacification.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(8) Military Intelligence Activities

(a) General: During the quarter, the 4th Military Intelligence Company provided Counterintelligence, Imagery Interpretation, Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Order of Battle support to the division. This included maximum effort in intelligence collection and production prior to the CAMBODIAN operation and general support during the course of those operations.

(b) Counterintelligence: The operations of the CI Section during the quarter included targeting individuals and small local force units, increasing the VIP Program, and developing agent sources within the Camp Radcliff area. Continual operations were carried on to screen all indigenous employees at all 4th Division base camps and to develop agent sources within these employees.

(c) Interrogation of Prisoners of War: Accurate and timely information was provided the division by the effective interrogation of prisoners of war and the accurate translation of captured documents by the IPW Section. The section was also able to provide detailed information through the skillful exploitation of prisoners and HOI CHANHS. This was particularly noticeable during the operation in CAMBODIA, where the information gained by these interrogations and translations resulted in many tactical targets being found and destroyed.

(d) Duffelbag Operations: During the last three months the Duffelbag program has continued to increase sensor coverage along Highway 19 and in the Camp Radcliff TAOR. During this period a complete sensor system was emplaced around the Golf Course Army Airfield and aviation personnel were trained in the employment of the sensors. Technical support was also given to the 1st Logistical Command to assist that organization with the employment of sensors.

(e) G2 Air Reconnaissance: The G2 Air Section has provided continual support for the division with VR, airborne personnel detection, red haze and photo missions. Close coordination with the Imagery Interpretation Section has given the field commander timely and accurate photographic coverage of an operational area. Photographic studies prepared of the major areas of enemy activity have provided increased intelligence on enemy operational areas, his tactical procedures and subsistence methods. A study of Red Haze readings has established that early morning missions provide the greatest accuracy.

(f) Order of Battle Sections: An automatic data processing system developed by the Order of Battle Section has allowed the storage and instant recall of thousands of hard intelligence facts. Since it became operational during the latter part of May, the system has provided useful and timely information not only to the G2 section, but to the G3 and G5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

division staff sections and battalion S2 and S3 sections and LRR teams. Current usage has averaged over one and a half times a day and has been steadily rising since its conception. In addition the section has provided timely and accurate analyses of enemy movement, trends, and capabilities.

(9) Weather Forecasting

(a) Support provided

1	Hourly weather observations	3000
2	Special weather observations	420
3	Routine scheduled forecasts and amendments	305
4	Planning forecast issued to select staff agencies twice daily	180
5	Aircraft accident reports (Summary of existing weather at the time)	10
6	Monthly climatology reports for II MR	3
7	Out of station briefings conducted at request of staff agencies	30
8	Telephone requests for weather information	3500
9	Area climatology summaries and special area of long range forecasts	10
10	Climatology briefings and safety briefings to aviation companies	6

(b) The most significant operational problem occurred during BINH TAY #1 when approaching monsoons placed a severe limitation time on operations being conducted in CAMBODIA.

c. Operations and Training Activities

(1) Operations

(a) The 4th Infantry Division was disposed as shown on Map 1, Inclosure 4, at the beginning of this reporting period.

As the period began, both brigades were disposed and involved in two major operations. The 1st Brigade was operating in the DAK PAYOU (VC) Valley area while the 2d Brigade was working to the north of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVD OH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

AN KHE targeted against the GIA LAI Provincial unit. On 2 May both brigades received warning orders to cease operations and prepare to redispense their forces in preparation for a major operation in CAMBODIA.

The redistribution of forces began with the 3-506th Airborne Battalion of the 1st Brigade, which was operating in the DAK PAYOU Valley area, airlifting from LZ MATTIE to Camp Radcliff. The 1-12 Inf (-), 1-22 Inf, and 2-35 Inf of the 2d Brigade also began their moves into Camp Radcliff. On 4 May, the 3-12th Inf, operating in the DAK PAYOU Valley area, with 1st Brigade elements reverted to division control, and returned to Camp Radcliff to begin base camp security operations. In addition, the 1st Brigade tactical command post airlifted to NEW PLEI DJERENG, while the remaining elements of its command post group and the 3-506 Airborne Battalion convoyed overland to Camp Holloway near PLEIKU. The 1-14th Inf moved overland and closed on LZ MEREDITH, and then prepared to continue to move overland the next day to NEW PLEI DJERENG, where it would begin its combat assault. The 3-8th Inf remained at Camp Radcliff and continued preparations for the operation.

The redistribution of forces continued through 6 May with 2d Brigade elements occupying LZ MEREDITH, LZ JACKSON HOLE, and LZ OASIS. The 3-8th Inf of the 1st Brigade convoyed overland on 5 May from Camp Radcliff and closed LZ MEREDITH preparing to combat assault on 6 May.

All aircraft on 5 May, D-Day, were dedicated to the single lift of one battalion at a time. This involved the use of some sixty lift ships to first move the 3-506th Airborne Battalion to its objective area. The first aircraft into the LZ received heavy ground to air fire. Because no suitable alternate LZ was available, the mission had to be aborted due to time and distance factors.

In spite of airstrip congestion at NEW PLEI DJERENG, control factors, dust, and an inadequate number of refuel/rearm points, three major attempts were made on 5 May to insert the 3-506th. LZ's finally used were located at YA 413537 and YA 415545. By the end of D-Day (5 May), only one battalion with supporting elements was operational in CAMBODIA. Because there had been little time to pre-position all elements forward for multiple assaults, the short time span did not make any allowances for imperfections in the execution phase.

On 6 May the 1st Brigade continued to insert its forces into CAMBODIA. Enemy fire severely hampered the insertion of the 3-8th Inf, and airstrikes were unable to suppress the enemy fire. However, after the insertion of only sixty men in an alternate LZ, one helicopter was shot down. Another try was made, however, resulting in two damaged aircraft. Throughout the remainder of the day the 1-14th Inf fared somewhat better and was able to insert 75% of its troops, which completed the brigade activities of 6 May. The 1st Brigade completed the balance

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDOH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

of its moves on 7 May with twelve aircraft. The 2d Brigade used the other 48 lift ships to move its three battalions (1-12, 1-22, and 2-35) into their fire bases. They experienced no significant enemy contacts during the remainder of the lift.

Ground and air operations conducted against the enemy in CAMBODIA were generally light to moderate actions. The contacts resulted in some 212 enemy KIA. (See Inclosure 6).

Several significant cache discoveries were also made during the course of this operation. Elements of the 3-506 Abn Battalion for instance, found a huge rice cache of approximately 500 tons and a weapons and ammunition cache containing over 800 individual weapons. (See Inclosure 6).

Even though the major tactical effort was completed on 16 May 70 with the extraction of the division elements from CAMBODIA, because of ARVN operations that were continuing in Base Area 702, both the 3-8th and 3-506th Infantry Battalions established fire bases in the FLEI TRAP Valley. This provided contingency fire support just east of the CAMBODIAN border for the ARVN battalions which continued to operate in the vicinity of the cache sites discovered earlier by the 3-506 Airborne Battalion.

#### (b) Division Controlled Operations

During May, the 2-8th (Mech) Inf conducted operations west of Highway 14, between FLEIKU and KONTUM. The battalion conducted operations north of AN KHE, east and west of Highway 508 in the first part of June and moved west to operate between FLEIKU and the CAMBODIAN border in the latter part of June. During July the battalion conducted operations south of AN KHE down Highway 2E, east and west of the SONG BA River.

The first week in May the battalion continued to clear and secure Highway 14 from FLEIKU to KONTUM with its command post at LZ RIPPLE. Two companies were employed to strong point the road and to conduct reconnaissance in force operations in the area adjacent to the highway. During the hours of darkness the companies set ambushes and augmented the bridge defenses of the 1-6th RF Company by deploying mounted squads at bridge sites. A third company with two platoons dismounted conducted search and clear operations and saturation ambushing to the northwest of FLEIKU. No significant contact was made with the enemy during this period.

On 4 May the battalion assumed the mission of securing the road from Junction Highway 19 west and Highway 14 to NEW FLEI DJERENG. Each company mineswept the road and positioned strong points in that portion of the road assigned to it.

On 3 May the 2-1st Cavalry relieved the battalion of its road security mission and the battalion then set up a command post at NEW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

PLEI DJERENG and secured that logistical base. A third company conducted dismounted reconnaissance in force operations west of NEW PLEI DJERENG. D/7-17th Cav (attached) and A/2-1st Cav (OrCON) mineswept and secured other lines of communication surrounding NEW PLEI DJERENG. Convoy escorts were provided when required.

(c) Division Artillery

1 1st Brigade: The 1st Brigade, supported by the 6-29th Arty, conducted operations against elements of the 95B Regiment in Base Area 202 (VC Valley). The operation was initiated in April 1970, and on 1 May, Task Force Pursuit of the 101st Airborne was on LZ MATTIE with three howitzers at LZ BIG WINDY. B/6-29th Arty, in direct support of the 3-12 Infantry was on LZ DORIS, A/6-29th Arty and C/6-29th Arty were at Camp Radcliff making final preparations for the airlift into the base area. The next day the brigade received a warning order to prepare for an assault into CAMBODIA on 5 May. The 3-506th Infantry of Task Force Pursuit became OrCON to the 1st Brigade, D/2-320 Arty OrCON 6-29th Arty on 3 May, and D/2-320 Arty and B/6-29th Arty airlifted to Camp Radcliff from their locations in VC Valley. On 4 May the 6-29th Arty tactical command post moved overland to NEW PLEI DJERENG to provide coordination for the planned operation.

D/2-320 Arty was airlifted with the 3-506 Abn from Camp Holloway to LZ CURANEE in CAMBODIA. On 6 May, C/6-29th Arty airlifted from NEW PLEI DJERENG to LZ DRAGON. Meanwhile, the advance party from A/6-29th Arty combat assaulted to the vicinity of grid YA 488639, and began fighting to secure the area for a fire base for the 3-8th Infantry. The company commander of C/3-8th Infantry was killed in the action, and the battery commander of A/6-29th Arty took command of the company, organized a defense for its position, called in artillery and sent out patrols. A/6-29th Arty suffered two WIA and C/6-29th Arty supported the ensuing contact with close-in artillery fire until the next morning when the enemy fled the area. On the following day, A/6-29th Arty airlifted from LZ MARETH to LZ PHILLIPS, where it joined its advance party.

Orders were received the second week in May to withdraw from CAMBODIA, but 4th Division Artillery would continue to provide artillery support for two ranger battalions (ARVN) that continued to operate in the base area, from two fire bases occupied to the east of the border in the PLEI TRAP Valley.

On 17 May D/2-320 Arty airlifted with the 3-506 Abn from LZ WILDCAT to NEW PLEI DJERENG where it chopped to Task Force Pursuit control for an airlift by C-130 to BAN ME THUOT. C/6-29th Arty airlifted from NEW PLEI DJERENG to LZ WILDCAT to provide artillery fire support for Operation BINH TAY #2, and B/6-29th Arty convoyed from Camp Radcliff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

to NEW PLEI DJERENG to provide artillery support to the 1st Brigade tactical command post at NEW PLEI DJERENG. As ARVN operations closed in the base area on 25 May, A/6-29th Arty airlifted from LZ SCOTT to NEW PLEI DJERENG, C/6-29th Arty airlifted from LZ WILDCAT to NEW PLEI DJERENG, and A/1-92 Arty airlifted to NEW PLEI DJERENG where it returned to the 52d Arty Group control, terminating Operation BINH TAY #2.

After a brief standdown, the 1st Brigade received a new mission to search and clear suspected staging and headquarters areas of the 95B Regiment in the DAK PAYOU Valley area. The brigade concept of operation was to encircle the objective areas with battalion size forces and send a one company sweep through the objective area. Initially the 3-12th Infantry and 1-14th Infantry were working in the northern portion of Base Area 202 with the 3-8th Infantry in the southeast portion of Base Area 202. The artillery fire support plan called for one 105mm battery to be located at LZ BUCKEYE, one 105mm battery and a platoon of 155mm howitzers at LZ DORIS. The 6-29th Arty tactical command post relocated to LZ BLACKHAWK to facilitate command and control of the operation. By 1 June B/6-29th Arty had moved overland from Camp Radcliff to LZ BLACKHAWK and was airlifted to LZ BUCKEYE. On 2 June one platoon of A/1-92 Arty arrived by convoy at LZ BLACKHAWK and became GSR to the 6-29th Arty, and A/1-92 Arty then airlifted to LZ DORIS. A/5-16th Arty (-) at LZ ACTION became GSR to the 6-29th Arty while A/6-29th Arty moved overland from Camp Radcliff to LZ ACTION and airlifted to LZ NUTMEG. The first week of June was characterized by minor readjustments to OrCON artillery elements, and scattered enemy actions.

By 23 June the operation terminated and B/6-29th Arty returned to LZ BLACKHAWK where it spent the night before conveying to PLEIKU to provide support of Operation BINH TAY #4 and the GVN elections in eastern BINH DINH Province. On 26 June, C/6-29th Arty conveyed from LZ BLACKHAWK to LZ UPLIFT where it chopped to the control of the 173d Airborne Brigade to participate in Operation BINH TAY #4, in the PHU MY area. The GVN elections were held on 27 June and elements of the 1st Brigade were sent to populated areas to ensure minimum hostilities during the elections. The 3-8th Infantry went to the PHU MY District with C/6-29th Arty located at LZ UPLIFT and OrCON to the 173d Airborne Brigade.

The last week in June saw the 1st Brigade begin operations in the AN LAO Valley directed against elements of the 3d NVA Division. As the 2-35th Infantry chopped to control of the 1st Brigade with A/4-42 Arty on LZ WELCH OrCON to 6-29th Arty, one platoon of C/1-92 Arty (155mm towed) at LZ WELCH became GSR to the 6-29th Arty. A/6-29th Arty moved overland from Camp Wilson to Camp Radcliff and chopped to the control of 4-42d Arty. On 1 July the 6-29th Arty tactical command post moved overland to LZ ARMAGEDDON to facilitate better control of artillery fires.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Operations continued to the northwest of Base Area 226 during July with minor readjustments of supporting artillery units.

2 2d Brigade: During the first week in May 1970, the 2d Brigade with the 4-42d Arty in support, initiated operations with three infantry battalions with their direct support artillery batteries north of AN KHE against the GIA LAI Provincial units, only to be extracted suddenly when notice was received of the pending operation in CAMBODIA. A/4-42 Arty with the 2-35th Infantry airlifted from LZ RAQUEL to Camp Radcliff on 4 May, and then moved overland by convoy to LZ MEREDITH, southwest of Camp Enari on 6 May. B/4-42 Arty with the 1-12th Infantry moved overland by convoy from LZ AQUARIUS to Camp Radcliff on 4 May, and moved again by convoy to LZ OASIS on 5 May. C/4-42 Arty airlifted with the 1-22d Infantry from LZ NIAGARA to Camp Radcliff on 3 May, and on 5 May, C/4-42 Arty with the 1-22d Infantry moved by Air Force C-130 to FLEIKU Air Force Base and then moved overland on 6 May to LZ JACKSON HOLE. Operation BINH TAY I went into effect, and the 2d Brigade and 4-42 Arty established tactical command and operations centers at NEW FLEI DJERENG in conjunction with supporting elements. On 7 May the 2d Brigade was combat assaulted with three battalions of infantry and its respective direct support artillery batteries into multiple LZ's in Base Area 702 in CAMBODIA. A/4-42 Arty with the 2-35th Infantry combat assaulted from LZ MEREDITH to LZ CONQUEST. B/4-42 Arty and the 1-12th Infantry combat assaulted into LZ INVASION while C/4-42 Arty with the 1-22d Infantry combat assaulted into LZ SPERHEAD. The 2d Brigade was targeted against enemy elements, installations, and facilities of the B-3 Front and the 24th NVA Regiment. On 12 May the 1-12th Infantry and B/4-42 Arty were relocated by air assault into LZ COMMANCHE in the vicinity of YA 431635 with the 1-12th Infantry reverting to 1st Brigade control and B/4-42 Arty reverting to 6-29th Arty control. The 2d Brigade ceased operations in CAMBODIA on 14 May with the 1-22 Inf, 2-35th Inf, and their supporting artillery batteries being airlifted to NEW FLEI DJERENG. By the 16th, the 1-12th Infantry and B/4-42 Arty, which had been OICON to the 1st Brigade, airlifted to NEW FLEI DJERENG, reverting back to the 2d Brigade and the 4-42d Arty control respectively. All 2d Brigade supporting elements, maneuver battalions, and supporting artillery then moved overland to Camp Radcliff for a standdown and began preparations for future operations in BINH DINH Province.

Operation PUTNAM PARAGON was initiated on 18 May 1970 with the 2d Brigade inserting three infantry battalions to the north and west of Camp Radcliff to conduct offensive operations targeted against the C/2-407th Sapper Battalion and the GIA LAI Provincial headquarters in their known areas of operation. Emphasis was placed on small unit operations with ranger and recondo techniques used to the maximum. On 18 May the 1-22d Infantry (-) combat assaulted into multiple LZ's in its assigned area of operation with the command post and 4.2 mortars at LZ CHIPPEWA. However, C/4-42 Arty remained at Camp Radcliff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDOH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

providing responsive fires for IDCC and other elements of the 1-22d Infantry. On 21 May the 2-35th Infantry with A/4-42 Arty established a fire base at LZ WARRIOR and combat assaulted three companies into multiple LZ's in the area of operations. The 1-12th Infantry and B/4-42d Arty established a fire base at LZ KIOWA, and once again the 4-42d Arty had under its control its three organic firing batteries.

By 2 June the 2d Brigade had shifted its attention to elements of the GIA LAI Provincial headquarters further to the north of Camp Radcliff. In response to this, the 1-22d Infantry with C/4-42d Arty airlifted into LZ BAXTER. On 4 June, 1C/1-92 Arty (two tubes) of 155 airlifted from FSB BLACKHAWK to LZ BLACKHAWK to provide added support to the planned operations. In response to significant findings by the K-75 Rangers, the 1-12th Infantry combat assaulted into multiple LZ's to the west of LZ BAXTER. The command post of the 1-12th Infantry and B/4-42d Arty airlifted from LZ KIOWA to LZ CHEYENNE on 8 June.

The second week of June, the 2d Brigade received O&CON of the 2-8th Mech with the mission to provide road security along Highway 508 for engineering efforts on Hill 666. The battalion established its command post at LZ ARMAGEDDON with B/5-16th Arty in direct support. Consequently, B/5-16th Arty became O&CON 4-42d Arty effective 9 June. On 20 June, the 2-8th Mech was given the mission of road security from PLAIKU to DUC CO, as a result the brigade released O&CON of the 2-8th Mech and 4-42d Arty released O&CON B/5-16th Arty. The 2d Brigade continued to conduct offensive operations to the north of Camp Radcliff and to interdict the lines of communication between the GIA LAI Provincial headquarters and the 3d NVA Division. The lack of available air assets necessitated that all moves utilize overland routes as much as possible to conserve helicopter assets.

On 28 June the 2d Brigade released the 2-35th Infantry to 1st Brigade control and received O&CON 3-12th Infantry with its command post at LZ CHALLENGE. Consequently, the 4-42d Arty released A/4-42d Arty to 6-29th Arty O&CON and received O&CON B/6-29th Arty. C/1-92 Arty became GSR 6-29th Arty and 1A/1-92 Arty GSR 4-42d Arty.

The division now had two brigades targeted against the infiltration routes of the 3d NVA Division along the SUOI KON River and the GIA LAI Provincial unit along the SONG BA River, plus the C/2-407th Sapper Battalion to the northwest of Camp Radcliff. Command post/1-12th Infantry and B/4-42d Arty were repositioned at LZ UTE on 1 July to provide the necessary control and artillery coverage for the new 2d Brigade area of operation along the SONG BA River. Two tubes of D/5-16th Arty moved overland from Camp Radcliff to LZ ARMAGEDDON on 1 July to provide mutual support for LZ UTE and additional fire support for 2d Brigade maneuver elements. Command and control elements at the 2d Brigade and 4-42d Arty displaced to LZ ARMAGEDDON.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDJL-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, MCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

During the remainder of July, 2d Brigade elements continued to conduct offensive operations to interdict the 3d NVN Division, GIA LAI Provincial headquarters and C/2-407 Sapper Battalion.

3 The 1-10th Cavalry, under division control, had the mission of securing Highway 19 from the AN KHE Pass to the PLEIKU sector boundary. The 5-16th Arty, in addition to its general support mission, provided two liaison sections and one 155mm SP battery in direct support. In early May, C/5-16th Arty was in direct support to the 1-10th Cavalry, with three tubes at LZ SCHUELLER and three tubes at LZ BLACKHAWK. On 28 June, B/5-16th Arty moved three tubes to LZ ACTION and three tubes to LZ BLACKHAWK and assumed the direct support mission. The following day, C/5-16th Arty moved from LZ BLACKHAWK to LZ SCHUELLER to Camp Radcliff and resumed its general support mission. Operations of the 1-10th Cavalry throughout the reporting period consisted of posting security forces and reacting to enemy harassing attacks on Highway 19.

4 The 2-8th Mech performed a number of missions under division control during the reporting period. The 5-16th Arty provided a liaison section, three forward observation parties, and a 155mm SP battery in direct support. A/5-16th Arty (-) (four tubes) was in direct support at LZ RIPPLE. On 4 May, the 2-8th Mech received the mission to secure the road network from PLEIKU to NEW PLEI DJERENG and to secure the LSA complex at the latter location in support of the deployment of the division into CAMBODIA. In response, A/5-16th Arty (-) moved to LZ BURGESS to continue direct support. The remaining tubes joined the battery from Artillery Hill on 9 May. The 2-8th Mech was given a contingency mission to make a mechanized sweep into Base Area 702 in CAMBODIA, and A/5-16th Arty made the necessary preparations to accompany the battalion, but the mission was not executed.

On 17 May, the 2-8th Mech was sent to the PLEIKU Rocket Box. A/5-16th Arty (-) (two tubes) moved to LZ TRACER to provide artillery support. By 2 June, the 2-8th Mech assumed the mission of securing TL508 and the engineer work parties at LZ ARMAGEDDON. B/5-16th Arty moved six tubes to LZ ARMAGEDDON to provide artillery support. From 9-20 June 1970, the battalion was under the ORCON of the 2d Brigade and B/5-16th Arty was ORCON to the 4-42d Arty. On 21 June the 2-8th Mech returned to the highlands to provide security for QL19 from PLEIKU to DUC CO. B/5-16th Arty accompanied the battalion and established firing positions at LZ MREDITH and LZ OASIS. The battalion returned to Camp Radcliff on 28 June and B/5-16th Arty moved to LZ BLACKHAWK and LZ ACTION to assume the mission of direct support to the 1-10th Cavalry. On 2 July the 2-8th Mech initiated operations south of Camp Radcliff targeted against the 95B Regiment and C/5-16th Arty moved to LZ SOPAN to provide direct support.

On 2 June the battalion moved into the area north of AN KHE along

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Highway 508, and assaulted into LZ RED with the mission of conducting dismounted reconnaissance in force operations during daylight hours and saturation ambushes at night. The remainder of the battalion moved by tactical road march to PSB ARMAGEDDON. After reaching the fire base, Company C prepared itself for its assigned mission of securing engineer units moving to Hill 666 in the vicinity of BR 398689.

On 20 June the battalion moved west toward FLEIKU to secure highway 19W from traffic control post 31 to the CAMBODIAN border.

On 29 June the battalion moved to Camp Radcliff and conducted stand-down activities until 2 July when it moved to its new area of operation south of AN KHE by tactical road march. The battalion worked its assigned area of operations by conducting reconnaissance in force operations during daylight hours, ambushing at night, and providing security for the water point located in the vicinity of LZ SOZER.

(1) Armored Cavalry Operations

The 1-10th Cavalry was primarily responsible for convoy security of Highway 19. This was accomplished by establishing a series of observation points located on key terrain features. Selection of these OP's was based upon maximum observation of the highway fields of fire and likely enemy avenues of approach. Each OP was manned by a tracked vehicle with a series of platoon (minus) bases being established at critical bridges requiring 24 hour surveillance. During the hours of darkness all bridge sites were physically manned or ambushed to prevent enemy destruction. These night ambushes employed night observation devices in addition to the mechanical ambush apparatus. Enemy interdiction of the highway was reduced by conducting sweeps up to platoon size along the highway and into areas of suspected activity. The squadron air cavalry troop assisted in the highway security mission by conducting aerial reconnaissance of suspected enemy locations. In addition the troop performed the normal fire support and interdiction role assigned to air cavalry.

(e) The 4th Infantry Division was disposed as shown on Map 2, Inclosure 4, at the end of the reporting period.

(2) Summary of OPLANS and OPORDS published:

(a) Background Information

1. Toward the end of April, the division began preparing to initiate operations against the GIA LAI Provincial units located northwest of AN KHE, and to continue operations against the 3d NVA Division in Base Area 226 along the SONG CON River.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVODH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, MCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

2 OPLAN 15-70, 19 April 1970, prepared the division for operations against the GIA LAI Provincial units. D-Day for implementation was tentatively set for 24 April 1970.

3 Task Organization prior to implementation of OPLAN 15-70:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
3-12 Inf	3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf
TF Pursuit	1-22 Inf	2-8 Inf (Mech)
3-506 Abn	1-14 Inf	1-10 Cav
C/7-17 Cav	2-35 Inf	
C/75 Rangers		

4 On 27 Apr 70, FRAGO 29-70 implemented 15-70 with D-Day effective 30 April 70. FRAGO 29-70 required the following changes:

a 2d Brigade close out FSB JOHN HENRY and ARNOLD TRAIL and deploy 1-14 Inf and 3-8 Inf to LZ HARD TIMES, CHOP to 1st Brigade on arrival. 1st Brigade then deploy 1-14 Inf and 3-8 Inf to Camp Radcliff for 48 hour standdown. On 3 May, 1st Brigade CA 1-14 Inf and 3-8 Inf into an AO to conduct operations against GIA LAI Provincial units.

b No change in mission or organization was outlined for other divisional units.

5 On 1 May 1970, FRAGO 30-70 was issued to implement OPLAN 15-70, and to delineate specific missions and responsibilities of divisional units. Basically, the FRAGO accomplished the following:

a It caused a realignment and redistribution of division forces to accomplish the mission.

b It committed the 1st Brigade to operations with one infantry battalion against GIA LAI Provincial units 40 kilometers northwest of Camp Radcliff. This was a change from the two battalion force originally envisioned. However, K/75 Ranger was tasked to provide the bulk of its assets to the GIA LAI Provincial units' area. 1st Brigade received OPCON 1-10 Cav plus its area of operation and a security mission along Highway 19E. The 1st Brigade was now operating both north and south of Highway 19E against the 958 Regiment and GIA LAI Provincial units.

c The 2d Brigade continued operations northeast of AN KHE against the 3d NVA Division. The 1-12 Inf (-) was released from division control and given to the 2d Brigade.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-NH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

d Task Organization envisioned as of 4 May 1970:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
IF Pursuit	1-12 Inf (-)	2-8 Mech
3-8 Inf	1-22 Inf	C/1-12 Inf
3-12 Inf	2-35 Inf	K/75 Ranger
1-14 Inf		
1-10 Cav		

e 2-8 Mech continued to secure Highway 14N.

(b) On 3 May 70, 4th Inf Div received the IFFV FRAGO initiating operations in CAMBODIA, with D-Day set for 5 May. The division had received a warning order on the evening of 2 May and had begun planning that night so on 3 and 4 May all battalions were extracted from the field and began movement to staging areas. On 4 May OPORD 16-70 (BINH TAY #1) was published. Following are the salient features of that OPORD:

1 Task Organization

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	3-12 Inf
1-14 Inf	1-22 Inf	2-8 Mech
3-506 Abn	2-35 Inf	2-1 Cav
		1-10 Cav
		K/75 Ranger
		C/75 Ranger
		7-17 Cav

2 Mission: On 5 May 1970, the division conducted search and destroy operations in northern Base Area 702.

3 The concept called for the entire division, less one battalion (3-12 Inf), the cavalry squadron, (1-10), and K/75 Rangers to deploy into CAMBODIA, or be in direct support of operations in CAMBODIA. On 16 May, the task organization was as follows:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	3-12 Inf
1-14 Inf	1-22 Inf	2-8 Mech
3-506 Abn	2-35 Inf	2-1 Cav
C/75 Ranger		1-10 Cav
		K/75 Ranger

The division had released OPCON 7-17 Cav to IFFV. OPORD 17-70, published on 13 May, outlined all of the above.

(c) While the bulk of the division was deployed into CAMBODIA, the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

3-12 Inf and K/75 Rangers continued operating in the division permanent area of responsibility. FRAGO 31-70 deployed the 3-12 Inf (-) southwest of Camp Radcliff to conduct search and clear operations against the X17 VC Engineer Company, which was operating against the DONG CHIE resettlement center. The operation commenced on 7 May with the 3-12 Inf (-) moving overland into the area of operation. The 1-10 Cav continued to secure Highway 19E. K/75 Rangers continued to deploy teams generally north and northwest of Camp Radcliff to gather information and intelligence on enemy locations and disposition.

1 On 17 May 70, IFFV FRAGO 33-70 was published. It deployed the 3-506 Abn and one troop (A) of the 2-1 Cav to BAN ME THUOT, releasing OPCON of that unit to IFFV upon arrival. This was accomplished on 19 May. Additionally, the 3-12 Inf was deployed to NEW FLEI DJERENG to replace the 3-506 Abn with the 1st Brigade receiving OPCON of that unit. This was accomplished on 18 May 1970.

2 On 18 May, the 2d Brigade commenced search and clear operations north of Camp Radcliff against the C2 Company, 407th NVA Sapper Battalion, after a four day standdown at Camp Radcliff. This mission was given to the brigade in O-ORD 17-70. The brigade initiated the operation with the 1-22 Inf but was not able to immediately insert its remaining battalions because of a contingency mission given to the division by IFFV.

3 On or about 18 May the division received a contingency mission from IFFV, to be prepared to deploy two infantry battalions to eastern BINH DINH Province to relieve ARVN elements which might be committed to CAMBODIA. To this end, OPLAN 18-70 was published on 21 May. Although the OPLAN remained in effect for approximately seven to ten days, it was never implemented, as the requirement never arose.

(d) On 23 May 1970, OPLAN 19-70 was published. Its purpose was to outline division operations after the termination of BINH TAY #1, scheduled for 25 May 1970. The following concept was envisioned:

1 2-1 Cav and C/75 Ranger revert to OPCON of IFFV after termination of BINH TAY #1 and close out of NEW FLEI DJERENG.

2 2-8 Mech terminates operations vicinity PLEIKU and return to Camp Radcliff.

3 1st Brigade extracts all elements from the FLEI TRAP Valley and NEW FLEI DJERENG; deploys to Camp Radcliff for a four day standdown and initiates operations in VC Valley against the 95B Regiment. (BA 202).

4 The 2d Brigade continues operations against the C2 Company.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH.

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, MCS CSFOR-65 (M2) (U)

407th Sapper Battalion (NVA) and prepares for operations against GLA  
LAI Provincial units.

5 The 2-8 Mech, after standdown at Camp Radcliff, initiates operations to secure engineer work parties upgrading Highway 508 and constructing a forward operating base on Hill 666.

6 The 1-10 Cav continues present mission securing Highway 194.

7 Task organization as outlined in OPLAN 19-70:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	2-8 Mech
3-12 Inf	1-22 Inf	1-10 Cav
1-14 Inf	2-35 Inf	K/75 Ranger

(e) On 24 May 1970, FRAGO 34-70 was published. Basically, it implemented OPLAN 19-70 as outlined below:

1 C/75 Ranger was released from OPCON 1st Brigade to IFFV.

2 K/75 Ranger initiated its mission of gathering intelligence against GLA LAI Provincial units.

3 It gave the 2d Brigade a be prepared mission to assume the 2-8 Mech mission of securing Highway 508 and Hill 666. This was based on the fact that the 2-8 Mech might remain in the vicinity of PLEIKU longer than originally envisioned.

(f) On 28 May, FRAGO 35-70 was published. It further clarified the execution of PLAN 19-70 and gave the 1st Brigade a D-Day for operations against the 95B Regiment of 1 June. It deployed the 2-8 Mech from PLEIKU to Camp Radcliff and relieved the 2d Brigade of the be prepared mission along Highway 508 and Hill 666. D-Day for the 2-8 Mech was set at 2 June 70. Also, effective 30 May 70, 2-1 Cav (-) was released from OPCON 4th Division to IFFV. Essentially, with the initiating of operations in Base Area 202, by the 1st Brigade on 1 June, the division was almost in the same posture as it was prior to CAMBODIAN operations, except that the 2-8 Mech was now available for operations in the division area of operations.

(g) On 31 May, FRAGO 36-70 was published assigning C/7-17 Cav a direct support mission to the 1st Brigade and D/1-10 Cav a direct support mission to the 2d Brigade. C/7-17 Cav became OPCON to the division on 1 June 1970.

(h) On 6 June, FRAGO 37-70 was published tasking the 2d Brigade to initiate operations along the PLEIKU/BINH DINH/KONTUM boundary with

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

the 1-12 Inf, against the GIA LAI Provincial units. It also changed the priority of K/75 support from the GIA LAI area of operation to the 1st Brigade in Base Area 202 effective 8 June 1970.

(i) On 8 June, FRAGO 38-70 was published giving the 2d Brigade OCON of the 2-8 Mech, its area of operation, and mission. This was done to facilitate control in the area of operations between the 2d Brigade and the 2-8 Mech.

(j) FRAGO 39-70 was issued on 11 June deploying one platoon from the 2d Brigade to the 1-10 Cav to assist in securing MONTAGNARD villages approximately two kilometers east of LZ SCHUELLER. This action was accomplished on 12 June.

(k) On 13 June FRAGO 40-70 was published. Its purpose was to initiate operations against LOC's of the 3d NVA Division in northern BINH DINH Province. The mission was given to the 2d Brigade and in effect was a continuation of its current operations with orientation more towards the northern parts of the division area of operation. The 2d Brigade still retained the requirement for operations against the GIA LAI Provincial units, and for security of the engineer effort along Highway 508. To accomplish the mission, two infantry battalions would be deployed basically along the SONG CON River infiltration corridor, while one infantry battalion and the mechanized battalion continued operations against the GIA LAI Provincial units. The 1st Brigade continued operations in Base Area 202 with three infantry battalions.

(l) On 15 June 1970, FRAGO 41-70 was published so as to intensify operations along Highway 19E with patrols and ambushes, in an attempt to identify routes of movement across the highway, and destroy enemy elements operating along the Highway. The following missions were outlined in the FRAGO:

1 The 1st Brigade was reoriented to operate just south of Highway 19 between LZ SCHUELLER and LZ ACTION. Rcn/3-8 Inf was placed OCON to the 1-10 Cav.

2 The 1-10 Cav would increase ambush and patrol activity by employing Rcn/3-8 Inf, sniper teams, and aero rifle platoons in this role.

3 K/75 Ranger release OCON two sniper teams to 1-10 Cav and conduct reconnaissance and interdiction in an area just north of the 1-10 Cav area of operation, northwest of LZ SCHUELLER with a minimum of five teams.

4 The 2d Brigade continued its present mission north of Camp Radcliff.

(m) On 20 June FRAGO 42-70 was published, deploying the 2-8 Mech

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, HCS CSFOR-55 (H2) (U)

on road security mission between the intersection of Highway 19W and Highway 14, and the CAMBODIAN border. This was in support of ARVN operations across the border. (BINH TAY #4).

(n) On 23 June FRAGO 43-70 was published, redeploying forces to provide further support for BINH TAY #4 and for GVN elections. The following missions were outlined in the FRAGO:

1 The 1st Brigade terminates operations in VC Valley (Base Area 202); deploys one rifle company to LZ OASIS and releases OPCON to 2-3 Mech; deploys one infantry battalion (-) to relieve ARVN of security mission in the FLEIKU Rocket Box. This was all in support of BINH TAY #4. Additionally, deploy two infantry battalions vicinity PHU MY District on 27 June, release OPCON to 1731 Abn Brigade. (Only one battalion, 3-8, was actually deployed). The purpose of this mission was to provide security for GVN elections on 28 June. Also one rifle company was given OPCON to the 1-10 Cav. This also was in support of planned 1-10th Cav security operations for elections in AN TUC District.

2 The 2d Brigade continued missions against the 3d NVA Division and GIA LAI Provincial units.

3 The 2-8 Mech, reinforced with one rifle company, continued to secure Highway 19W from the intersection of Highway 14 to the CAMBODIAN border.

(o) On 26 June FRAGO 44-70 was published giving the 1-10th Cav the mission of conducting screening operations northeast and southwest of AN TUC to prevent enemy interference in GVN elections on 28 June.

(p) On 26 June OILAN 20-70 was published. It was designed to reorient divisional operations after security operations for BINH TAY #4 and GVN elections were completed. Basically, it committed both brigades to operations north of Camp Radcliff against GIA LAI Provincial units, the 3d NVA Division and its rear elements. Also, it reassigned forces of the division within the two brigades. Following is a summary of the OILAN:

#### 1 Task Organization

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	2-8 Mech
1-14 Inf	3-12 Inf	1-10 Cav
2-35 Inf	1-22 Inf	K/75 Ranger

2 2d Brigade: Continues present mission against GIA LAI and LOC's of the 3d NVA Division. Release OPCON of 2-35 Inf to 1st brigade and receive OPCON of 3-12 Inf upon its arrival from FLEIKU. The 2d Brigade

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20 August 70

AVDDH-GC-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

was also given the mission of coordinating security, quartering and operations of support activities at ARMAGEDDON since both forward brigade headquarters were to be stationed there. Basically, the combat mission of the 2d Brigade did not change.

3 The 1st Brigade, which had deployed all its combat elements to support BINH TAY #4 and GVN elections, except one infantry battalion, was committed to operate north of the 2d Brigade units, to locate and destroy the 3d NVA headquarters and rear service elements. It received OXCON 2-35 Inf from the 2d Brigade to accomplish its mission and would receive OXCON 3-8 Inf upon its closure to Camp Radcliff from PHU MY District. Following are the actions required by OPLAN 20-70:

a. 1-10 Cav continue security operations along Highway 19W.  
b. 2-8 Mech release OXCON the one rifle company which had been attached for security of Highway 19W. (B/3-12 Inf).

c. 3-12 Inf, under Division control, redeploy from LAIKU to Camp Radcliff and CHO to the 2d Brigade on arrival.

(q) On 27 June FRAGO 45-70 was published executing OPLAN 20-70. D-Day was set for 28 June 70. There were no major changes from those envisioned in the OPLAN. 2-8 Mech was to move overland to Camp Radcliff on 28 June and receive a three day standdown prior to initiating operations in VC Valley.

(r) On 27 June 70, OPLAN 21-70 was published outlining the mission and concept of operation for 2-8 Mech deployment against the 95B Regiment and local force units south of AN KHE.

(s) On 1 July, FRAGO 46-70 was published implementing OPLAN 21-70. No changes from the OPLAN were listed.

(t) On 2 July, the 4th Infantry Division received a message from CG, IFFV, alerting it to deploy one brigade to eastern BINH DINH Province to attack a number of targets. One of the missions was to deploy one rifle company to vicinity of CAM RANH Bay to operate in the DONG BO, a mountain overlooking the installation. On 8 July, FRAGO 47-70 was published, assigning this mission to the 2d Brigade. The company (B/1-22) was deployed on 8 July, and returned on 11 July.

(t) On 11 July, FRAGO 48-70 was published, returning the flame platoon to its parent unit (2-8 Mech). The flame platoon had been augmenting security along Highway 508 OXCON to the 2d Brigade.

(u) To meet the mission assigned the 4th Infantry Division by the Commanding General, IFFV, OPLAN 22-70 was published on 13 July 70. It

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDCH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, MCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

outlined the following mission and concept of operation:

1 Task Organization for the operation:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trns</u>
3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	2-8 Mech
3-12 Inf	1-14 Inf	1-10 Cav
2-35 Inf	1-22 Inf	K/75 Ranger

2 The 1st Brigade was to deploy its three infantry battalions into the western portion of northeast Base Area 226 in cooperation with the 40th ARVN Regiment, which would deploy two infantry battalions into the eastern portion of northeastern Base Area 226. This was to be a combined operation to locate and destroy elements of the 3d NVA Division operating in the area. It also took advantage of a CRID operation being conducted in southern Base Area 226.

3 The 2d Brigade would continue operating north of Camp Radcliff with the mission of interdicting the LOC's and infiltration corridors of the 3d NVA Division along the SONG-CON River and SONG BA River. The 2d Brigade was assigned specific objective areas in which to operate which would complement the 1st Brigade and 40th ARVN Regiment operations.

4 No change in operational status was outlined for the 2-8 Mech nor the 1-10 Cav.

5 Tentative date for the operation was 17 July 1970.

(v) On 13 July, FRAGO 49-70 was published to accomplish redisplaying of forces of the 1st and 2d Brigades. Basically, it implemented the task organization in OPLAN 22-70, and deployed 1st Brigade units to LZ TWO BITS for a three day standdown prior to the start of the operation.

(w) On 14 July 70, FRAGO 50-70 was published implementing OPLAN 22-70. There were no changes from the OPLAN except that one troop (-) from the 1-10 Cav was deployed to PHU CAT to conduct screening operations in conjunction with the CRID operation in southern Base Area 226. D-Day for OPLAN 22-70 was set for 17 July and the operation was initiated on that day. The troop (-) 1-10 Cav deployed on 20 July.

(x) On 23 July, FRAGO 51-70 was published directing the mission and concept for Phase II of 1st Brigade operations. It deployed two battalions of the 1st Brigade into the northern NUI MIEUS in cooperation with the 40th ARVN Regiment, which would be operating in the southern NUI MIEUS, and also with the 173d Abn Brigade and 41st ARVN Regiment, which would occupy blocking positions. This was a continuation of the operation in northeastern Base Area 226, and it commenced on 28 July. Additionally, one battalion of the 1st Brigade was deployed into the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20 August 70

AVDDH-CC-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

FISHHOOK area to conduct recon operations. It was assigned four specific objective areas to recon, generally along the I MR/IIMR boundary. The 2d Brigade also was given one objective in the same general area, just west of the FISHHOOK, in which to conduct reconnaissance operations. These operations continued through the end of July.

(y) On 30 July FRAGO 52-70 was published redeploying C Troop (-) 1-10 Cav back to Camp Redcliff and placing it OrCON to the 2-8th Mech for operations in the vicinity of Base Area 202.

(z) Operational names throughout the period:

1 PARK SILVER: 1-10 Cav; security of Highway 19E from PLEIKU defensive boundary to CRID border continuing throughout the period.

2 BAIRD SILVER: 2-8 Mech; security of Highway 14 from PLEIKU to KONTUM and security of FSB WEIGT DAVIS. Terminated on 4 May 70.

3 CHEADLE BLUE: 2-8 Mech; search and clear operations in PLEIKU Rocket Box northeast and west of PLEIKU. Commenced on 15 May and terminated on 28 May 70.

4 ROBERTSON WHITE: 2-8 Mech; security of engineer work parties along Highway 508 and Hill 666. Commenced on 1 Jun 70 and terminated on 9 June 70.

5 WRIGHT BLUE: 2-8 Mech; security of Highway 19W from intersection of Highway 19W and Highway 14 to CAMBODIAN border. Commenced on 23 June 70 and terminated on 28 June 70.

6 BRANDIES BLUE: 2-8 Mech; search and clear operations against the 95B Regiment in VC Valley. Commenced on 2 July and is continuing.

7 FREDENDALL GOLD: 2-1 Cav; security of Highway 19W from PLEIKU to NEW PLEI DJERENG. Commenced on 18 May and terminated 30 May 70.

8 WAYNE WIND: 1st Brigade and TF Pursuit; operations against the 95B NVA Regiment in VC Valley (Base Area 202). Terminated 4 May.

9 WAYNE JUMP: 1st Brigade; northwest of NEW PLEI DJERENG in the PLEI TRAP Valley in support of ARVN operations in northern Base Area 702. Commenced on 16 May and terminated on 26 May 70.

10 WAYNE HURDLE: 1st Brigade; search and clear operations in VC Valley (Base Area 202). Commenced on 1 June and terminated 26 June 70.

11 WAYNE FAST: 1st Brigade; search and clear operations against elements of the 3d NVA Division to include headquarters and rear

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-CC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

elements located 40 kilometers north of Camp Radcliff. Commenced on 28 June and terminated on 14 July 1970.

12 WAYNE SPAN: 1st Brigade; search and clear operations in north-eastern Base Area 226 in cooperation and coordination with the 40th ARVN Regiment and the 173d Abn Brigade and search and clear operations in northern NUI MLEUS in cooperation and coordination with the 40th ARVN Regiment, 41st ARVN Regiment, and the 173d Abn Brigade. Commenced on 17 July and is continuing.

13 PUTNAM PLATEAU: 2d Brigade; search and clear operations 40 kilometers north of Camp Radcliff against elements of the 3d NVA Division. Terminated on 4 May 70.

14 PUTNAM PADAGON: 2d Brigade; search and clear operations north of Camp Radcliff against the C2 Company of the 407th NVA Sapper Battalion, GIA LAI Provincial units, and LOC's of the 3d NVA Division. Commenced on 18 May and is continuing.

15 BINH TAY #1: All divisional units involved in operations in northern Base Area 702 or support operations from VIETNAM in Base Area 702. Operation initiated to destroy enemy forces, supplies, installations, and resources of the B-3 Front. Commenced on 5 May and terminated on 16 May 1970.

### (3) Chemical Activities

(a) The 4th Division Chemical Section and the 43d Chemical Detachment supported extensive aerial and ground employment of Riot Control Agents, aerial and ground employment of diesel fuel for control of vegetation, and operated and maintained the division Airborne Personnel Detectors. Technical advice was rendered on the use of flame field expedients and inspections were conducted on CBR readiness, equipment and supplies. The chemical ammunition supply point continued to operate in support of the division.

(b) There were no defoliation or crop destruction operations during the period due to the nonavailability of defoliation agent, and no cleared areas for crop destruction. The only vegetation control program was conducted on Camp Radcliff using diesel fuel.

(c) Riot Control Agent munitions were used extensively in support of combat troops and played a vital role in the destruction and demoralization of enemy targets and troops detected and located by special intelligence. Persistent and non-persistent riot control agents were employed throughout the division area of operation in support of ground troops, artillery fires, and to block enemy withdrawal routes from contact areas.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20 August 70

AVDDH-CC-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

1. The amount of micropulverized persistent CS employed during the period decreased over the last period. The chemical section employed 44 55 gallon drums of persistent CS against targets south of the AN KHE Pass by air drop from CH-47 helicopters. The drums were employed to contaminate infiltration routes and deny the enemy free use of the terrain. Some three hundred pounds of CS were used to seed suspected infiltration and exfiltration routes through the perimeter wire on Camp Radcliff and four hundred pounds of CS were used to contaminate areas on HON CONG Mountain.

2. Non-persistent CS was employed extensively from the air using the XM-15 (M158R2) CS canister cluster. These canisters were used against suspected enemy locations in conjunction with artillery and air strikes. A total of 348 XM-15 munitions was employed during the period.

(1) Airborne Personnel Detector operations were flown a total of 152 hours during a total of 77 missions.

(4) Organization and Training

(a) Organization: A provisional unit, the Mobile Ground Surveillance Radar Section of the target acquisition platoon, division artillery, was organized to improve operational readiness and centralize control of division radar assets. DIVARTY is in the process of receiving augmentations of personnel and equipment for the unit, which should become operational in early August.

(b) Trainings: The 4th Infantry Division Training Detachment trained a total of 4,607 personnel during the period.

1 Replacement training: 3,902 EM and 303 Officers

2 Combat leadership course (NCO Academy): 149 students

3 Scouts: 99 students

4 RF/PF: 105 students

5 Sniper Program: 49 students.

d. Logistics

(1) Logistical Operations

(a) The beginning of the monsoon during this reporting period had very little effect on the movement of supplies. Thus, land lines of communication remained the primary mode for movement of all classes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

of supplies throughout the division area of operation. Favorable weather conditions throughout the period contributed to overland movement and created good flying conditions for air lines of communications. The movement of troops and supplies during the period was accomplished in an efficient and timely manner.

(b) Elements of the 45th General Support Group and the 593d General Support Group, both of the QUI NHON Support Command, continued to provide logistical support to the 4th Infantry Division in support of Operation HINES. Logistical support activities at LZ ENGLISH, Camp Radcliff, and NEW FLEI DJERENG support division operations during the reporting period.

(c) In late April 1970, the division received ORCON of the 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry (Airborne) and C/75th Rangers. These units formed Task Force Pursuit and on 1 May 1970 initiated an operation in VC Valley. The 4th Infantry Division Support Command provided all support and service support for both units.

(d) On 4 May 1970, the 2-8th Infantry (Mech), under division control, moved from the KONTUM area to FLEIKU. While in FLEIKU, the unit received Classes II, IV, and V support from the division supply office at Camp Radcliff. All other classes of supply were provided by the 45th General Support Group at FLEIKU. The 45th General Support Group also provided all services to the battalion.

(e) On 4 May 1970, the 4th Infantry Division Support Command deployed to NEW FLEI DJERENG to establish a forward support base in support of division units while in CAMBODIA. During this operation, division units were provided maintenance support, medical support, transportation, and graves registration by DISCOM. Units deployed with the basic load of Classes I and V, and an initial stockage of Class IV at NEW FLEI DJERENG was provided by DISCOM. The 45th General Support Group provided Classes I, III, IIIA, and limited items of Class IV. The 45th General Support Group also augmented the 4th Supply and Transport Battalion in meeting the division transportation requirements. Class V was provided by the 184th Ordnance Battalion forward support unit. Laundry service was provided by a civilian contractor at Camp Schmidt, FLEIKU. The division received ORCON of the 2-1st Cavalry for this operation and provided it with the same logistical support as provided the division units.

(f) On 28 June 1970, DISCOM established a forward support element at Fire Support Base ARMAGEDDON in support of OPLAN 20-70. The forward support element stocked limited items of Classes I, II, III, IV, and V. All other classes of supply were provided by permanently established facilities at Camp Radcliff. Bath, water, maintenance, and medical services were also provided at Fire Support Base ARMAGEDDON. Back-up services were provided from Camp Radcliff. A rearm/refuel point was

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (A2) (U)

also established at ARMAGEDDON in support of this operation.

(g) On 16 July 1970, a DISCOM forward support element was established at LZ UPLIFT. Emphasis was placed on throughput of supplies from QUI NHON to the forward support element at LZ UPLIFT. Class I, fast moving Class II, Class III, limited Class IV, and Class VI (sundry packs) items were throughput to the forward support element at LZ UPLIFT. Class V was drawn from ASF 593-1 at LZ ENGLISH. All remaining classes of supplies were issued by the division supply office at Camp Radcliff to unit property book officers. The forward support element provided bath services to division units participating in this operation with two mobile shower units, and laundry service was provided by a civilian contract laundry at QUI NHON. Graves registration was provided by the 243d Field Service Support Company with augmentation of personnel from the Division Support Command forward support element. Maintenance support was provided by the Maintenance Contact Team, D Company, 704th Maintenance Battalion, operating at LZ UPLIFT. A light medical clearing company of the 4th Medical Battalion provided units with medical support. In addition, the 4th Supply and Transport Battalion augmented the refuel point at LZ UPLIFT with personnel and equipment.

(h) On 20 July 1970, C Troop (-), 1-10th Cavalry deployed to PHU CAT in support of ROK forces operating in Base Area 226. All support and services were provided this element by ROK forces. Back up maintenance support was provided by maintenance contact team operating at LZ UPLIFT.

(i) Forward support elements to include maintenance contact teams and medical clearing companies were employed throughout the period in direct support of brigade task forces.

(j) Supply Services

1 Division Supply Office

Requisitions received: 13,000

Requisitions passed: 1,737

Requisitions filled: 7,258

Total due out releases: 3,831

2 Class I issues:

(a) Rations issued (three meals per ration)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RGS CSFOR-65 (42) (U)

LOCATION	A RATIONS	C RATIONS	SUNDRY PACKS	LRMP'S
Camp Radcliff	1,121,705	161,906	3,065	
LZ ARMAGEDDON	38,260	35,796	722	1,984
Totals	1,159,965	197,702	3,787	1,984

(b) Headcount and number of ration breaks as of 31 July 1970:

LOCATION	A RATION HEADCOUNT	TOTAL RATIONS HEADCOUNT	NUMBER OF UNIT BREAKS
Camp Radcliff	1,121,705	1,283,611	79
LZ ARMAGEDDON	38,260	76,040	30
Totals	1,159,965	1,359,651	109

3 Class III:

(a) Bulk POL issues in gallons

LOCATION	JP-4	AVGAS	MOGAS	DF-2
Camp Radcliff	1,576,000	0	736,000	988,000
BLACKHAWK	700,000	0	30,000	90,000
ARMAGEDDON	600,000	0	25,000	120,000
PLEI DJERENG	682,000	1,000	30,000	65,000
TWO BITS	15,000	0	0	0
Totals	3,573,000	1,000	821,000	1,263,000

(b) Packaged POL issues

LOCATION	OE-10	OE-30	OE-50	OE-90	GAA (lbs)
Camp Radcliff	9,260	39,970	10,300	6,875	16,385
PLEI DJERENG	60	1,100	500	0	350
Totals	9,320	41,070	10,800	6,875	16,735

4 Class IV issues:

LOCATION	ROLLS OF BARBED WIRE	COILS OF CONCERTINA	SANDBAGS	3'	6'
Camp Radcliff	683	8,171	1,413,000	15,247	30,715
PLEI DJERENG	252	3,714	372,000	6,327	6,377
LZ ARMAGEDDON	40	756	115,000	2,500	3,108
LZ UPLIFT	54	884	100,000	2,442	2,553
Totals	1,029	13,525	2,000,000	26,516	42,753

5 Baths: 48,600

6 Graves registration

a Human remains processed: 121

b Personal property shipments processed: 139

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

2 The US Air Force expended the following quantities of Classes II and V in support of operations:

<u>a</u>	<u>Class III</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
	Fighters	1,578,461.5 gal
	B-52	276,923.1 gal

<u>b</u>	<u>Ordnance</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Weight (s/t)</u>
	Bombs	3,509	950.0
	CBU	142	45.8
	Napalm	1,554	417.9
	Rockets	23	4.6

c Delivered by fighters and AC-47 (Spooky):

<u>Ordnance</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Weight (s/t)</u>
20mm	153,200	38.3
7.62mm	746,000	18.6

<u>d</u>	<u>Ordnance</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Weight (s/t)</u>
	B-52 Bombs	6	123.0

(k) Transportation services

1 The division controlled Highway 19W from FLEIKU to the CAMBODIAN border during the period 4-26 May 1970. During this period, there were 164 convoys consisting of 4,320 vehicles along Highway 19W.

2 With the establishment of FSB ARMAGEDDON, the division transportation officer commenced monitoring convoys on Highway 508. Through 31 July there were 92 convoys consisting of 1740 vehicles along the highway.

3 Company B, 4th Supply and Transport Battalion, hauled both supplies and personnel from Camp Radcliff to forward support areas throughout the period. When the need occurred, augmentation of transportation requirements was received from elements of the 8th Transportation Group.

4 Aircraft support

- a Total cargo tonnage moved by dedicated air: 34
- b Total passengers moved by dedicated air: 21,912\*
- c Total cargo tonnage moved by SMAR: 3
- d Total cargo passengers moved by SMAR: 507\*

\*These figures represent the total number of passengers flown out of the AN KHE Army Airfield.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

e. Total cargo tonnage moved by opportune air: 0

f. Total passengers moved by opportune air: 0

(1) Medical services: The 4th Medical Battalion, with Companies B and C supporting the 1st and 2d Brigades respectively, and Headquarters and A Company supporting base camp, provided the following patient actions during the period:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PATIENTS SEEN</u>	<u>PATIENTS ADMITTED</u>	<u>RETURNED TO DUTY</u>
HQ&A	8051	433	297
B Company	5120	142	77
C Company	852	257	79
Total	14028	832	453

(2) Material Readiness

(a) During the reporting period, the operational readiness of tactical vehicles, mortars, and generators has shown improvement. The operational readiness of tactical vehicles improved from 88% to 90%, mortars from 94% to 99%, and generators improved slightly from 82% to 83%. The operational readiness of combat vehicles was the same as at the beginning of the reporting period. Prior to 1 July 1970, combat vehicles were not deadlined for failure of the intercom system. This was changed on 1 July 1970 and several combat vehicles were deadlined for intercoms that were inoperable. The combat vehicles deadlined for intercoms have been repaired and the deadline has returned to the same low figure as at the beginning of the period. Communications equipment, artillery, radar, and heavy engineer equipment decreased in percentage of operational readiness during the reporting period. The operational readiness of artillery is, however, still at 97%. The increased deadline of communications equipment and radar is attributed to increased command emphasis in the utilization and maintenance of these items. The decrease in the operational readiness of heavy engineer equipment relates directly to the increase in the deadline of dump trucks during the last two weeks of the reporting period, caused primarily by the highway construction project on Route 508.

(b) During the month of July, the division requested and received a thorough inspection of the NCR 500 system at the 704th Maintenance Battalion direct support supply activity. As a result of this inspection, a 100% inventory is being conducted at the direct support supply activity. It is expected that results of the inventory and second NCR system will be an increased supply responsiveness. Also during the reporting period, several CMMI's were conducted by this headquarters on the direct support operations of the 704th Maintenance Battalion. As a result of these inspections, direct support shop operations of all maintenance companies were thoroughly revised with a view toward

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

increased operational efficiency.

(c) Maintenance support

1 Headquarters and A Company (main support company), 704th Maintenance Battalion continued its role of providing direct support maintenance for division base camp elements, back up direct support for the battalion forward support companies and contact teams, supply of Class IX (repair parts), and retrograde of material. D and C Companies provided direct maintenance support to the 1st and 2d Brigades, respectively. Company E (Transportation Aircraft Maintenance Company) continued its aircraft direct support maintenance mission.

2 During the reporting period, emphasis was placed on employment of complete maintenance support companies in the forward areas. During operations in CAMBODIA, C Company operated at NEW PLEI DJERENG, and D Company operated at PLEIKU. At the close of this reporting period, D Company was operating at LZ UPLIFT. In other cases, maintenance contact teams were employed in the forward areas.

e. Civilian Affairs

(1) Civic Action

(a) The major civic action effort during this period was the completion of the MONTAGNARD Heights project. This project consisted of consolidating the ten MONTAGNARD hamlets located on the western end of the TAOR into a village complex. Work on the project began on 27 May 1970 with construction of perimeter barriers and bunkers. The perimeter was built around four hamlets located on the south side of Highway 19. Six hamlets located on the north of Highway 19 were relocated into the new perimeter. The construction of perimeter barriers and relocation were completed on 17 June 1970, and a resident civic action team was placed in the consolidated village. This team gave some stability and assisted in establishing a security system to defend the village. The resident team, working in coordination with MACV and GVN officials, established a security plan based on one PF platoon and a 22 man SON THON cadre element. A PF platoon was recruited from the MONTAGNARDS in the village and is presently in training. The resident team was removed from the village on 26 July 1970 because its mission had been accomplished. An effective workable security system has been established in the village and cooperation with local GVN authorities and the people has made this project one of the most successful in the present TAOR.

(b) Another project presently underway is the construction of a model sanitary hamlet. This project consists of taking one of the existing hamlets in AN TUC District and establishing a sanitation program. The sanitation program will consist of:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

1 Providing technical assistance for constructing wells, latrines, and land fills to adequately meet the needs of the people.

2 Training hamlet personnel in all aspects of personal hygiene and sanitation.

(2) Psychological Operations

(a) On 7 July 1970, twenty-five 105mm leaflet projectiles were test fired. Fifteen projectiles were packed with snug fitting rolls and ten were packed with loose fitting rolls. Twenty weight paper was used for all rolls. All projectiles burst at the proper height and leaflets were evenly disseminated throughout the target area. One hundred twenty-five projectiles are on hand for follow up missions to air strikes or landing zone preparations.

(b) The 1-22d Infantry received an NVA rallier on 22 June 1970, who had been infiltrating with an NVA unit which had been heavily engaged by elements of the 1-22d Infantry. The HOI CHANH was exploited through many PSYOP methods, and as a result, he made live aerial broadcasts and taped messages. He also wrote a message to his friends and allowed his picture to be taken for use on a leaflet.

(c) During the last week of July, special leaflets and tapes were developed in support of the 2-8th Infantry (Mech), which was operating in an area occupied by MONTAGNARD NVA/VC sympathizers and supporters. The messages contained an appeal for the MONTAGNARDS not to help the NVA/VC, and additionally informed them that if they did support the NVA/VC, then they would be considered our enemy.

f. Personnel

(i) Strength: Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and close of the period were as follows:

(a) Beginning of Period	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized-organic units	880	184	12,965	14,029
Assigned-organic units	908	184	12,861	13,953

  

(b) End of Period				
Authorized-organic units	880	184	12,965	14,029
Assigned-organic units	769	167	12,435	13,371

(2) Replacements: The division received a total of 325 officer and 3946 enlisted replacements. During the same period, 484 officers and 4340 enlisted men rotated out of the division.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(3) Casualties

UNIT	WOUNDED	HOSTILE		INJURED	NON-HOSTILE	
		DEAD	MISSING		DEAD	MISSING
1st Bde	159	24	0	73	2	0
2d Bde	119	22	0	43	3	0
DIVARTY	24	4	0	28	0	0
DISCOM	48	1	0	11	1	0
2-8th Mech	22	0	0	15	0	0
1-10th Cav	43	4	0	10	2	0
K-75 Ranger	25	0	0	6	1	0
Div Trps	14	1	0	28	3	0

(4) Morale and Personnel Services: Awards and decorations during the period were presented as follows:

DECORATION AWARDED	MAY	JUNE	JULY
Distinguished Service Medal	1	0	1
Silver Star	13	14	2
Legion of Merit	7	14	6
Distinguished Flying Cross	6	14	5
Soldiers Medal	5	11	8
Bronze Star (Valor)	39	80	25
Air Medal (Valor)	8	29	13
Bronze Star (Service/Achievement)	485	544	788
Army Commendation (Service/Achievement)	1442	1292	1577
Air Medal (Service)	1075	641	745
Purple Heart	243	119	66

(5) Promotions: A total of 4,103 enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period.

(6) Reenlistments: 170 enlistments/reenlistments were received. The breakdown of enlistments/reenlistments were 63 first term RA, 28 AUS, 78 career RA, and one ER/NG.

(7) Health

(a) The division is presently adequately staffed with medical and paramedical officers. There are also adequate numbers of lower grade enlisted personnel but the diminishing numbers of senior medical specialists and senior noncommissioned officers pose an increasingly serious problem for the near future.

(b) The total hospital admission rate has declined from the peak reached in May, which was associated with the CAMBODIAN operation, and is now at the level experienced prior to that operation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Malaria continues to be responsible for the major portion of the patients requiring hospitalization. It reached a peak coincident with the CAMBODIAN operation and has continuously declined since, but still remains the prime cause of hospital admissions. Except for the month of June, the rates of 1970 have been lower than the corresponding period last year. Indeed, this May saw the lowest rate experienced by the division during its operations in VIETNAM. In this area are both vivax and falciparum strains. Vivax has been responsible for approximately 30% to 50% of the total cases of reported malaria.

Fever of unknown origin is also a continuing problem which contributes to a majority of outpatient visits. Fortunately, most of these are of short duration and require little or no hospitalization. Generally, the amount of fevers rise with the incidence of malaria and fall in parallel. This has not happened these past months, with the fever rate rising despite the fall in malaria. It is felt that most of these cases are due to arbovirus infections and are being collected to confirm this fact.

Other diseases such as respiratory and diarrheal diseases continue in low incidence and have not been a significant problem. Skin diseases, while not a major cause of incapacity, continue to be a troublesome problem and the outpatient rate has continued to rise during these summer months. It has not, however, caused any increased rate of hospitalization.

#### g. Engineer

Engineer activities during this period were characterized by a greater commitment to combat support activities. The major activity of this period occurred when the entire battalion was committed in May to support the CAMBODIAN operation.

Engineer activities in CAMBODIA began with one company in direct support of each brigade, while one company was placed in general support of the division with the mission of maintaining Route 14B and constructing the division logistics base. The bridge company moved to PLEIKU where it remained at Engineer Hill and supported the division with heavy equipment, tactical bridging, and minesweeping, while maintaining the capability to provide float bridging. On termination of this operation, the battalion was again committed to the direct support of the infantry brigades and construction of a two brigade FSB and FSA at LZ ARMAGEDDON. In addition, the engineers opened and upgraded the land LOC to LZ ARMAGEDDON, completed the minimum essential operating facilities at Camp Radcliff, and furthered improvements on various defensive positions.

Company B provided direct support to the 1st Brigade. The normal level of support was one platoon plus reinforcing elements of up to one

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, MCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

additional platoon whenever the brigade relocated its command post. Principal tasks assigned were landing zone and fire base cutting and clearing and cache destruction. Normally one Case 450 minidozer operated in support of Company B and the 1st Brigade.

In addition to direct support of combat operations, Company B completed construction of ten large living/fighting bunkers at LZ ACTION, a semi-permanent fire support base on Highway 19, and began a similar project at LZ SCHUELLER. Other construction tasks included construction of defensive bunkers for a signal facility atop HON CONG Mountain, construction of several softball diamonds/volleyball court complexes throughout the base camp, and completion of offices and banking facilities for the American Express at the Camp Radcliff Exchange.

Company C provided direct support to the 2d Brigade. As with Company B, the level of support normally provided the brigade was one platoon with reinforcing elements up to an additional platoon for moves of the brigade tactical command post. The principal tasks accomplished by Company C in direct support were landing zone and fire base construction, clearing fields of fire and the destruction of enemy caches. In addition to the Case 450, a D-5 airmobile dozer was used to clear battalion fire support bases.

In addition to direct support of combat operations, Company C completed several construction projects at Camp Radcliff. These projects included the completion of the 2d Brigade tactical operations center, two revetments for medical evacuation helicopters, an observation tower, plus a guard tower at the 17th Field Hospital, upgrading and improving the defensive works at the 4th Division Helipoint, renovation of two bridges, and a twelve point helicopter rearm point with centralized ammunition storage area.

Company D remained in general support of the division throughout the reporting period. Upon its return from the CAMBODIAN operations, the entire company minus one platoon moved to LZ ARMAGEDDON to upgrade Route 508 extending from LZ EMELIA to LZ ARMAGEDDON into a limited use, all weather tactical road. The dump truck platoon and several items of engineer equipment from Company E were placed in support of Company D for this mission. This major road building effort expanded the capability of the division to conduct major operations in the northern portion of the division area of operation, reduced the helicopter blade time, and enabled the government of SOUTH VIETNAM to open new areas for resettlement.

Company D also provided direct support for the combat operations of the 2-8th Mech which normally operated under division control. An engineer squad was normally provided and was reinforced with a combat engineer vehicle, a D-7 dozer, and an AVLB from Company E. The major mission assigned this element was to enhance the mobility of the mechanized

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, ACS CSFOR-65 (A2) (U)

infantry by constructing combat trails, bridges, and fords. In addition, the squad constructed defensive works and cleared fields of fire at the 2-8th Mech night defensive positions.

One platoon of Company D remained at Camp Radcliff tasked with several construction projects. During this period the platoon constructed a finance vault for the American Express Banking facility at the Camp Radcliff exchange, constructed a security fence around and made other defensive improvements to the division tactical operations center, built several foot bridges in the division headquarters area, and completed the total renovation of the division war room.

Company E continued to provide the division with engineer equipment, tactical bridging, and transportation support. The unique capabilities of this company allowed it simultaneously to provide equipment in support of specific line company projects, including substantial hauling and equipment support to Company D for the upgrade of Highway 508, while undertaking several earthmoving and dust control projects assigned to the company itself.

Company E was also tasked with minesweep missions throughout the division area of operations. These missions were accomplished utilizing a combat engineer vehicle and an M48A3 tank, each with the expendable mine roller attached.

Company E placed two 34' dry span M4T6 bridges during the opening of Highway 508.

Other specific projects completed by Company E during this period included excavation of a new sanitary fill for Camp Radcliff, clearing over two million square meters of vegetation for fields of fire on the Camp Radcliff perimeter, clearing and preparing an area for RF/FF housing, and placing penprime on the helicopter field at Camp Radcliff and the helipads at LZ ARMAGEDDON and LZ UFLIFT.

#### h. Army Aviation Operations

(1) The 4th Aviation Battalion supported both brigades and attached units. Elements other than the two brigades receiving support from the 4th Aviation Battalion included division chemical, engineer, artillery, G-5, and Project Left Bank. The 4th Aviation Battalion AH-1G gunships provided fire support elements to both brigades. The LOH's provided visual reconnaissance and command and control aircraft. Support was accomplished by combat assault preparations and gunship cover for LRRP insertions and extractions, resupply, medevacs, and ground forces in contact. Snoopy and Scorpion teams consistently provided invaluable intelligence which resulted in numerous bunker complexes and fortifications destroyed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) In addition, the battalion operated a forward airfield located at Camp Holloway to support the division conducting operations west of PLEIKU and in CAMBODIA. The extension of the division area of operation and the lack of aircraft parts hampered aircraft support for the division to a limited degree.

(3) The battalion also maintained responsibility and supervision of the Golf Course Army Airfield at Camp Radcliff. Extensive work is being done in all areas of the Golf Course, such as repairing tactical wire, cutting grass, removing debris and trash, installing and relocating fighting positions, and repairing gates. A perimeter lighting system was installed and it greatly enhances overall security.

(4) Pathfinder support was provided both brigades and attached units in fire support bases, resupply installations and continuous operation of the air traffic control zone. Visual reconnaissance missions for possible LZ's and fire support bases was also conducted. Pathfinder support is used occasionally for rigging of downed aircraft. In addition, they assist in training personnel in rigging, extraction of equipment, and providing RF/PF in Pathfinder support.

(5) During the months of May, June, and July 1970, the following aviation support was provided to the 4th Infantry Division:

(a) Organic Aviation Support

	May	June	July	Total
Hours	5,211	4,701	4,905	14,817
Sorties	14,631	11,996	13,275	39,902
Tax	7,142	10,417	12,088	29,647
Tons (Cargo)	83	205	363	651
Acft Down	4	3	5	12
Acft Lost	1	0	0	1

(b) Average daily organic and non-organic support to the division:

	UH-1H	AH-1G	UH-1B/C	CH-47	OH-6A	CH-54
A Co, 4th Avn Bn	13					
B Co, 4th Avn Bn		4	2		4	
D/1-10th Cav	4	4			4	
E/704th Maint	1					
52d CAB	17		6	5		1
1st Bde					2	
2d Bde					2	
DIVARTY					5	
Total	40	8	8	5	17	1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVJDDH-GC-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

1. Inspector General Activities

(1) Fourth Infantry Division Annual General Inspections of one divisional unit were conducted along with two courtesy inspections in preparation for the unit's Annual General Inspection, and thirteen inspections were conducted of the unit storage and safekeeping of individual personal effects.

(2) Two hundred forty complaints were received by the Inspector General's office during the reporting period. The two major areas of complaints were medical with fifty-five, and unit administration with fifty-three complaints. One hundred eight requests for assistance were also received during the reporting period.

j. Signal

(1) Operations

(a) Operational activities continue to focus on providing multi-channel communications and radio teletype in support of the division and its elements.

(b) The largest operation undertaken during this period was when the division deployed a tactical command post forward in support of its elements in CAMBODIA. On 10 May 1970, a multi-channel communication system was installed between Camp Radcliff and the division tactical command post located at PLEIKU. Three multi-channel communication systems were installed from the division tactical command post to elements forward. One system went to each brigade located at NEW PLEI DJERENG and the third was installed to support the 2-8th Mech Infantry Battalion at JACKSON HOLE.

(c) Prior to the CAMBODIAN operation, the 124th Signal Battalion had operated in a fixed base camp environment for nearly three years. As a consequence, the battalion was gradually tailored to meet its fixed base camp mission. Under these conditions, there was no requirement to provide communications to a tactical division headquarters or support command. The battalion equipment was used to support the brigades or was turned in. In turn the brigades became dependent on the signal battalion for communications support, which would normally be provided from their own resources. The brigades had neglected their own communications equipment, and had become dependent on the signal battalion resources. As a result, this equipment could not be returned to division control without seriously hampering the brigade communications. Hence, at the start of the CAMBODIAN operation, the 124th Signal Battalion was ill equipped, organized, or trained to handle division communications to two tactical division headquarters simultaneously. The situation which the signal battalion found itself in at the start

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

of the CAMBODIAN operation points out the fact that organizations should, if at all possible, remain in their TOW configuration so that if the need arises they are properly prepared to carry out their tactical communications mission.

(d) At LZ BLACKHAWK on 1 June 1970, the 1st Forward Area Signal Center Platoon deployed one AN/MRC-69 and one AN/GRC-142 to LZ BLACKHAWK in support of the 1st Brigade tactical command post. The next day, one AN/GRC-163 and one AN/GRC-142 were installed for multi-channel communications and radio teletype support for the 2-8th Mech Infantry Battalion. On 20 June 1970, one AN/GRC-142 and one AN/MRC-69 were installed by the 2d FASCP in support of the 2d Brigade. At the same time in TLEIKU, one AN/MRC-69 and one AN/GRC-142 were installed to provide multi-channel communication and radio teletype support for the 2-8th Mech. In order to complete the multi-channel communication system, a relay was installed on Dragon Mountain.

(e) On 24 June 1970, one AN/MRC-69 was installed at Artillery Hill for telephone support for the 3-12th Infantry Battalion. One AN/GRC-142 was also installed for entrance into the division radio teletype special purpose net by the 3-12th Infantry Battalion. At LZ ARMAGEDDON on 5 July, the 1st FASCP installed one AN/MRC-69 and one AN/GRC-142 for communications support to the 1st Brigade. Communications center and switchboard facilities were also provided to the 1st Brigade. One AN/MRC-69 and one AN/GRC-142 were deployed to the vicinity BR 325274 to provide multi-channel and radio teletype communications between the 2-8th Mech and Camp Radcliff.

(f) The 1st Brigade deployed from LZ ARMAGEDDON to LZ UPLIFT on 18 July 1970. The 1st FASCP provided multi-channel communications between Camp Radcliff through a relay at PHU CAT, which was operated by C Company. The 1st FASCP also provided radio teletype, communications center and switchboard facilities for the brigade. On 26 July 1970, one AN/MRC-69 and one AN/GRC-142 were deployed in support of the 2-8th Mech to provide multi-channel communications and radio teletype with Camp Radcliff.

k. Information Activities

(1) News Media Correspondents

(a) During the period 1 May through 31 July 1970, a total of 52 civilian news correspondents visited the division, covering a variety of subjects ranging from pure hometown and human interest material to the division active combat operations. The bulk of the correspondents was here during the period 5-16 May 1970, with primary interest in division operations in CAMBODIA. Included were representatives from ABC, CBS, NBC, AP and UPI, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

21 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOA-65 (H2) (U)

Washington Star, Reuters News Service, Time and Newsweek Magazines.

(b) Housing and transportation for visiting correspondents were provided by the MACV Press Camp at Camp Schmitt and a Forward 4th Division Press Camp at NEW PLEI DJERENG. All routine matters were handled by the IO Rear at Camp Radcliff, enabling the IO Forward to concentrate its efforts on proper and timely briefings.

### (2) Radio/Television Activities

(a) Although there are no broadcast facilities at Camp Radcliff, the Information Office found it expedient to coordinate with AFVN affiliates in PLEIKU and QUI NHON. The command information messages (spots lasting 30 to 60 seconds) are given to these stations telephonically with the hard copy mailed simultaneously. This procedure is necessary for rapid dissemination of the information. Notable examples were the urgent warnings concerning the river flowing through Camp Radcliff, and the distinct possibility of swimmers contracting hepatitis from the contaminated waters.

(b) A relatively small number of broadcast hours concerning command and public information was noted, due to lack of facilities at Camp Radcliff. A total of 340 hard news items was released. These included combat and combat related activities.

(c) A total of 359 hard news release tape recordings were initiated and processed during the reporting period. This was a decrease from the previous quarter, and was due in a large part to the utilization of radio/television personnel to assist in press camp operations during the CAMBODIAN operation. A new avenue of release was initiated, which enabled the information office to release tapes directly to the Audio-Visual Center in New York. This allowed for wider dissemination, and provided the information office with highly professional advice concerning this operation. Results of the new procedures are still being studied, however, a high degree of effectiveness has been noticed.

(d) Attempts are being made to obtain improved AFVN radio and television reception within the division area of operation. Studies concerning needed equipment and the facilities required, installation, availability and expediency of delivery have been made, however, there has been no specific date established for installation.

### (3) Command Information Program

(a) Improvements in the distribution and dissemination of command information continue. Surveys indicate that Division personnel are receiving all informational materials on a timely basis. Command information fact sheets prepared for troop dissemination during the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, MCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

period included: Contraband, DOD Race Relations Task Force, VIETNAMESE Red Cross Drive Fund, The Facts About VD, Army Promotions-A Look Into The Future, and Army Emergency Relief Campaign Drive.

(b) The summer issue of the division quarterly magazine, Aspirit, was prepared, published and distributed. Distribution included medical facilities elsewhere in VIETNAM and in Japan. All incoming personnel processing through the 4th Replacement Company also received a copy. The most useful and effective tool available for the Information Officer to provide widest dissemination of command and public information continues to be The Ivy Leaf, the weekly division newspaper. Thirteen issues of The Ivy Leaf were distributed during the period. The material provided for the paper comes from all units and activities in the division and coverage is given to all action stories, human interest items, and general news concerning personnel and events occurring within the division. Additionally, articles from the Commanding General, the Adjutant General, Surgeon, and the Chaplains and Staff Judge Advocate offer timely and professional advice and guidance for commanders and troops. The Ivy Leaf also published periodical information concerning the reenlistment program with materials provided by division career counsellors. Present circulation of The Ivy Leaf, to include active and former members, is approximately 4,000 copies per week.

(c) Frequently, the 4th Division receives coverage in other publications within VIETNAM and also the Army Times. During the period the coverage received in other publications was as follows:

Stars and Stripes	147 column inches	8 photos
Army Times	116 column inches	6 photos
MACV Observer	188 column inches	10 photos
USARV Reporter	206 column inches	10 photos

#### (4) Fourth Division Association and Scholarship Fund

The Information Office assumed the responsibility for Custodian, Fourth Division Association and Scholarship Fund, on 4 July 1970. New members registered in this period totalled 1,330, bringing the membership total to 4,850. During the same period, \$12,210 in voluntary contributions to the Scholarship Fund was made, raising the balance of the fund to \$323,403.

#### 1. Highway Coordinator Activities

(1) During the reporting period, the Highway Coordinator's office continued to respond directly to the Assistant Division Commander-Maneuver in effecting coordination between the division, the US Army Support

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20 August 70

AVDDH-GC-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
 Period Ending 31 July 1970, MCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Command, QUI NHON, the ARVN II Military Region, the 93D Military Police Battalion, and other units concerned with security, traffic control, and engineer efforts along Highway 19 from the junction of Highway 1 near QUI NHON to AR 823470, vicinity the intersection of Highway 14 near PLEIKU. Major operational problems that confronted the Highway Coordinator were:

- (a) Defoliating and land clearing
- (b) Upgrading and repairing the highway
- (c) Communications procedures
- (d) Fire fighting responsibilities
- (e) Disabled vehicle recovery
- (f) Safe driving
- (g) Security

(2) A total of 1732 convoys consisting of 48,144 vehicles was monitored and controlled by the three convoy control stations. A statistical summary of all Highway 19 activities follows:

Activity	May	June	July
Convoys	623	540	569
Vehicles in Convoys	17,825	14,778	15,541
Ambushes (Convoys)	16	4	0
Sniper	15	3	8
Attack on Bridges, FSB, etc.	12	1	7
Mines			
Found	36	14	5
Hit	15	8	2
Total	51	22	7
Demolition Damage			
Bridges	1	0	0
Culverts	0	3	0
Open Road	0	2	0
Total	1	5	0
Vehicle Loss (US)			
Damaged	16	16	2
Destroyed	3	1	1
Total	19	17	3
Personnel Losses			
KIA	3	3	1
WIA	28	17	6
Total	31	20	7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS G3FOM-65 (R2) (U)

Vehicle Loss (Accident)

Damaged	5	9	7
Destroyed	1	0	0
Total	6	9	7

Personnel Losses (Accident)

Killed	1	1	3
Injured	10	9	7
Total	11	10	10

2. (C) LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

a. Personnel: None

b. Intelligence

Spikesid Sensor Device

(a) Observation: During the reporting period, a major problem was encountered when employing the spikesid sensor device due to the failure of the acoustic element to activate.

(b) Evaluation: The air delivered seismic device is designed to detect seismic vibrations in the earth's surface and to transmit a signal to a receiver-transmitter unit. Activation of the seismic detection element in the sensor in turn should activate the acoustic sensing element, thereby making it possible to acoustically monitor any activity in the vicinity of the seismic vibration. In practice the device was found to send only the seismic signal to the monitoring site, the acoustic element having failed to activate on most occasions.

(c) Recommendation: That the spikesid device be technically evaluated to determine the cause for the failure of the acoustic sensing element to activate and transmit the acoustic signal to the monitoring site.

c. Operations

(1) Requirements of Additional Liaison and Forward Observer Sections

(a) Observation: Additional liaison and forward observer sections over and above those authorized by MTOE are often required.

(b) Evaluation:

1 Assets: Current US division organization provides three sets of liaison/FO teams per direct support artillery battalion. Thus, prior to the inactivation of the 3d Brigade, the division was authorized nine sets

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOM-65 (R2) (U)

of liaison/FO teams and had eleven maneuver battalions. Subsequent to the inactivation of the 3d Brigade, the division has been authorized six sets of liaison/FO teams and has eight maneuver battalions. The general support battalion (5-16th Arty) is authorized two liaison teams and Headquarters, 4th Division Artillery is authorized one. Current doctrine envisions the use of these liaison sections with adjacent or reinforced non-divisional artillery units.

2 Semi-permanent requirements: The 6-29th Artillery provided a liaison section to the 1-89th Armor prior to its inactivation. The 5-16th Arty has provided a liaison section to the 1-10th Cavalry for some time and because of the size and configuration of the squadron area of operation, currently provides two sections. Since the inactivation of the 2-9th Artillery, the 5-16th Artillery has also provided a liaison section and three FO parties to the 2-8th Mech.

3 Temporary requirements: During the operation in CAMBODIA, division artillery provided a liaison team to the 2-1st Cavalry, which was OPCON to the division. Division artillery has frequently provided liaison teams to ROK and ARVN units during combined operations.

(c) Recommendation: That artillery units be prepared to constitute additional liaison teams and FO teams. Tactical doctrine and TOE should provide for automatic augmentation or reduction of authorized liaison and FO teams based on the number of maneuver battalions assigned to the division.

## (2) Fire Support Coordination for a Large Installation

(a) Observation: The large division command and control LSC complex at NEW PLEI DJERENG required coordination of fire support.

(b) Evaluation: Fire support for the installation defense of the NEW PLEI DJERENG complex was extensive. The fire support coordinator was responsible for integrating fires of 81mm mortars, 4.2 inch mortars, installation based 105mm howitzers, 155mm howitzers, and eight inch howitzers based outside the installation, quad 50 machine guns, and twin 40mm guns. Additionally, the employment of the AN/MPQ-4 counter-mortar radar and a 23 inch XENON searchlight had to be planned and coordinated. The proper use of all these resources required an around the clock team of personnel experienced in fire control, fire clearance, and fire coordination procedures.

(c) Recommendation: That when an installation as large as NEW PLEI DJERENG is established, it was determined that it is more efficient to task a battalion liaison team to perform the fire support coordination functions, and that the liaison team be the team from the maneuver battalion that provides security for the installation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(3) Engaging the Enemy Outside the Kill Zone

(a) Observation: A platoon size linear ambush was established along a north-south trail with the ambush positioned to the east of the trail. OP's were positioned north and south of the main element. An enemy element consisting of three individuals was spotted moving to the north approximately 100 meters to the west of and parallel to the trail. The element was engaged by six members of the platoon with negative results.

(b) Evaluation:

1 The effectiveness of the ambush was reduced as the enemy travelled parallel to the trail at some distance, thereby avoiding the killing zone. Engaging the enemy with less than one third the friendly element's fire power further reduced the effectiveness.

2 Normally the NVA are careless when they believe the area clear of friendlies and use well defined trails. However, in this situation, the enemy paralleled a trail, indicating they were aware of the friendly position, or because the division has been operating over large areas with small units, they are changing and operating off the trails.

(c) Recommendation: That mechanical ambushes be employed on the trail and a standard ambush be prepared on the flank of the trail at a point where route of travel is likely to be.

(4) Small-sized Ambushes

(a) Observation: Unit commanders found that by utilizing squad and half platoon sized ambushes, companies could effectively interdict a very large area and deny the enemy access to his usual trail networks.

(b) Evaluation: In mountainous and heavily vegetated terrain, it is very difficult to cover all likely avenues of movement of the enemy with company or platoon sized units. By further subdividing the platoons into squad or half platoon sized elements, depending upon the communications and leadership capability available, one company can establish screens to interdict enemy movement over a wide area.

(c) Recommendation: That when the size of the enemy force warrants, or when the mission of the friendly unit is primarily screening or interdicting, numerous small size ambush patrols be utilized.

(5) Stay-Behind Forces

(a) Observation: The use of stay behind forces can be used effectively against the enemy.

(b) Evaluation: It is a valuable tactical employment of unit

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (42) (U)

resources to place stay behind forces along well used trails at night locations upon departure, near watering locations, and near good or often used landing zones. In many cases, the enemy knows the general location of US forces and will attempt to move into a vacated area to search for discarded equipment or munitions, or even try to get a favorable position to conduct future sniper attacks.

(c) Recommendation: That stay behind forces be employed on a regular basis.

(6) Enemy Booby Trapping of Watermelons

(a) Observation: While clearing an LZ for a helicopter pickup, four men spotted a watermelon laying in the open on top of a paddy dyke. All four men were within ten to fifteen meters of the watermelon when one of the group attempted to pick it up. Immediately after the watermelon was lifted, an M-26 hand grenade detonated directly beneath it, killing the individual that lifted it and wounded two others within range.

(b) Evaluation: These four men disregarded the obvious placement of the watermelon for the purpose of attracting attention. Since there were no vines near the watermelon, they should have realized it might have been left on the dyke for a reason. The watermelon should have been treated as a booby trap and moved only after the entire area around it had been checked out closely. To prevent possible injury from shrapnel, a length of rope or string could have been attached to the watermelon and after selecting a covered position 25-30 meters away, pulled from its position. Under no circumstance should the watermelon have been eaten, due to possible poisoning.

(c) Recommendation: During standdown maintenance periods and at least once each month, all personnel of a unit should receive instructions concerning enemy booby trap techniques, with emphasis on not disturbing any item on the battlefield which is not required by the tactical situation, and on proper techniques for checking out an item if it must be moved.

d. Organization: None

e. Training: None

f. Logistics

(1) Prepackaged Resupply

(a) Observation: Occasionally, when a unit is in contact, an immediate resupply of Class V is required.

(b) Evaluation: By having a prepackaged basic load of ammunition

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, HCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

on a standby basis at the fire support base, the length of time required for emergency resupply of Class V can be greatly reduced. Packages should be handled either as an internal or sling load for a slick.

(c) Recommendation: That an emergency resupply of a company basic load of Class V be maintained in prepackaged, platoon-sized bundles ready for immediate delivery.

(2) Operation of Mini-Refuel Points

(a) Observation: During the CAMBODIAN operation, the 3-506th Infantry operated a "Mini" refueling point at its fire support base. This point consisted of three to four 500 gallon blivets and a small gasoline driven pump with filter/separator and one nozzle. This equipment gave the battalion the capability of refueling UH-1H and LOH helicopters supporting their battalion.

(b) Evaluation: This arrangement has the advantage of conserving blade time for supporting aircraft, permits the battalion commander to always have his command and control aircraft available, and is available in an emergency for other aircraft flying in the area. The mini-port can be used to top off aircraft that assemble for a short CA. This precludes aircraft from falling out for fuel during combat assaults.

(c) Recommendation: That consideration be given to operating "Mini" refuel points in forward fire support bases whenever the turn around time for refueling exceeds 20 minutes one way.

g. Communications: None

h. Material: None

i. Other: Civic Action

(a) Observation: Leaflets dropped from 1800 feet altitude travelled over eight thousand meters.

(b) Evaluation: In preparation for a leaflet drop, PSYO team members visited the landing zone of a battalion to coordinate with the S-3. It was determined that the leaflet drop should be made on an area approximately 8,000 meters from the landing zone. The pilot briefed the team on high wind conditions. Applying incorrect leaflet dissemination data, the pilot underflew the release zone by several thousand meters. Results: 1,000 to 3,000 leaflets missed the target area and landed on the landing zone.

(c) Recommendations:

1. That during high wind conditions aircraft fly lower to insure

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20 August 70

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, ACS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

more accurate leaflet dissemination.

2 That when the drop area is within 15,000 meters of a landing zone, extra care be taken to insure the accuracy of wind drift calculations

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Everett R. House*

EVERETT R. HOUSE  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

6 Incls

1. Task Organization
2. Key Personnel
3. Abbreviations
4. Maps 1, 2, 3
5. Locations
6. Statistical Summary (BINH TAY #1)

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